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THESIS

**GREEK-TURKISH CRISES SINCE 1955.
IMPLICATIONS FOR
GREEK-TURKISH CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

by

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March, 1997

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IMPLICATIONS FOR
GREEK-TURKISH CONFLICT MANAGEMENT**

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of the requirements for the degree of

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ABSTRACT

Past attempts to explain Greek-Turkish conflict have been built on two underlying themes. One theme focuses on incompatible Greek and Turkish interests while the other identifies cultural and social differences between the two countries as the primary causes for competition. Immediate causes for the conflict include issues ranging from domestic political considerations to the international setting. This thesis examines the 1955, 1963, 1967, 1974, 1976 and 1987 Greek-Turkish crises as it questions the primacy of underlying or immediate causes in Greek-Turkish conflict. After examining possible reasons for the failure of past mediations in resolving the underlying causes of the conflict, this thesis suggests that national interests as well as cultural realities from both sides of the Aegean have to be considered in any mediation attempt. Immediate causes do not seem critical for the evolution of the conflict even though they determine the development and outcome of particular crises. This thesis also recognizes, that successful resolution of Greek-Turkish differences will be of benefit not only to the two countries but to regional stability as well (Cyprus, Balkans, Southeastern Mediterranean). Organizations with which the two countries are associated, (NATO, EU, WEU) have only to gain from a Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Greek-Turkish conflict is seen by many as a parochial conflict with deep historical roots, an offspring of Balkan nationalism and politics. Indeed, Greek-Turkish relations have been marked by both antagonism and mistrust. Antagonism is the result of conflicting national interests as they have been expressed by both sides. Mistrust is explained by the culturally biased perceptions of the “other.” If antagonism and mistrust are considered givens in Greek-Turkish relations, so is a series of mediations undertaken by various parties, during or after crises. This thesis reflects the two dominant explanations for the conflict, namely the realist and cultural arguments, on the future of the Greek-Turkish relations, based on observed crises between the two countries and their outcomes since 1955. The selection of crises as a subject of study is based on the assumption that in crises one can observe policy choices which display the national interest, constrained by the structure of the international system as well as by domestic factors. This thesis proposes that the underlying causes of the crises can be traced to a change in the power outlook of the countries involved since the time international treaties codified the status quo, as we know it today. This thesis also observes through the crises of 1955, 1963, 1967, 1974, 1976 and 1987 --which are reviewed in Chapter II-- that Greek and Turkish national interests have not been consistently addressed by mediators. Rather, they have been taken into account only if they coincided with the interests of the mediators; otherwise they were at best nominally addressed, at worst ignored or even suppressed. Mediation efforts have also focused historically on integration of the two countries within a single geopolitical entity.

In the second part of the study, a cross-crisis analysis is performed to identify continuities and discontinuities among them. On what factors can we attribute different outcomes for similar crises? Do we observe any continuity in the way the two countries react during crises? After the characteristics for every crisis and mediation attempt are collected, we will have a comprehensive view of different “pictures” of the Greek-Turkish crises and we might be able to answer the following questions: (1) What causes crises? Should we follow Thucydides in his view of the primacy of the underlying cause

(interests) or revise him according to Lebow who insists on the primacy of the immediate causes for the explanation of the crisis origins? Do we observe any patterns in the underlying causes, which support the argument that they reflect power relationships, or do they suggest culture as the inhibiting factor for Greek-Turkish reconciliation? (2) Does there appear to be a more successful mediation pattern among the methods used? What is the relation of the mediators' interest to that of the contending parties?

The reviewed crises suggest the presence of different immediate and underlying causes. The underlying cause of the Greek-Turkish conflict is a set of incompatible interests in the Aegean and Cyprus. Those interests are defined in relation to one another in what becomes a zero-sum competition for primacy in a volatile and complex geopolitical region. Turkey, following its ascending regional status since 1955, has made steady effort to revise the situation established in the region by the treaties of Laussane, Montreux and Paris.

Beyond the existence of underlying causes of conflict in Greek-Turkish relations, there exists a set of phenomena and processes such as crises initiations, crises management and crises outcome which is directly related to the immediate causes of the conflict. Immediate causes include changes in the international or regional system, domestic politics, institutionalized perceptions of animosity, and the local balance of power, as well as crisis-dependent politico-military considerations. The inclusion of immediate causes becomes necessary if one attempts to explain the difference in outcomes of crises, given the continuities in political objectives.

Therefore, competition between Greece and Turkey exists in multiple dimensions, qualifying the "real" interest-based conflict. Cultural differences and the separate historical developments of the respective polities have resulted in state and societal structures that hold different values. On the other hand, both countries shared common allies and enemies for a long time, a condition resulting in security arrangements that brought them closer together. In reality, the history of Greek-Turkish crises seems to be the history of competitive centrifugal national interests and centripetal alliance or multilateral commitments. Mediation attempts have played an important role in Greek-

Turkish crises by attempting to reinforce those centripetal commitments, at least since 1955.

However, mediation has focused more on the immediate causes of the crises, because the intended outcome of mediation attempts has been regional stability instead of Greek-Turkish conflict management. Power mediation has been successful nonetheless, given that rationality eventually prevailed on both sides of the Aegean. The defusing of each crisis though did not ameliorate animosities. The underlying causes of the conflict have been largely ignored, reflecting the ad hoc and reactive nature of all mediations. Since 1974, and especially since 1987, the growing involvement of the European Community (now European Union) in the conflict allows for some optimism. Political-economic considerations may well achieve primacy over strict strategic-military ones if a contingency model for conflict management is followed. Such a model provides for power mediation to avoid or contain hostilities but most important is complemented by a series of measures to resolve the deeper, underlying causes of conflictual behavior.

As a final note, we should stress the potential for failure and its implications in managing Greek-Turkish conflict. Past crises show us the rational character of both Greek and Turkish decision-makers. The potential for conflict escalation however, should be related to utility calculations involving the status quo as well as to the potential gains and losses for each country in different scenarios. Experience since 1955 shows that both countries, when their national interest dictated, did not hesitate to confront NATO or US policies. The future of NATO, US Balkan and Middle Eastern policies, and European security and foreign policy interests are more assured with a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. The question of “how” can only be answered by a holistic view of the conflict, and not by biased compromises, especially among allies.

I. INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL

Greek-Turkish relations consistently surface as a threat to regional stability in most contemporary analyses of the Southeastern European strategic environment (Fuller and Lesser, 1993, p.114, Larrabee, 1996, Conostas, 1991, p.22, Huntington, 1996, p. 255). Greek-Turkish conflict is seen by many as a parochial conflict with deep historical roots, an offspring of Balkan nationalism and politics. President Clinton, following the US-EU Summit of 16 December 1996, noted common interests for the future of both countries and a “past that bedevils them.”¹ He thus epitomized American perceptions and attitudes towards the Greek-Turkish conflict by focusing solely on a historical explanation for the existing friction, as well as by promoting the concept of a prospective Greek-Turkish rapprochement, apparently important for American strategic interests in the region. However, both the descriptive historical explanation and the prescriptive strategic outlook need to be qualified if not outright rejected. The former focuses mainly on the cultural-subjective component of the conflict and ignores the existence of current as well as historic conflicting interests --some of them regarded as vital-- by both countries. The latter does not fully address Greek and Turkish security concerns, and therefore it does not guarantee stability. Reconciliation becomes uncertain in a strategic setting in which

¹ USIA transcripts posted at Internet site: [gopher://gopher.usia.gov/](http://gopher.usia.gov/)

intra-alliance cohesion is diminishing, cultural antagonisms are deepening, and the future of EU and NATO has not been agreed upon yet, while American foreign policy is still in search of principles and doctrines.

Greek-Turkish relations have been marked by both antagonism and mistrust. Antagonism is the result of conflicting national interests as they have been expressed by both sides. Mistrust is explained by the culturally-biased perceptions of the “other.”² If antagonism and mistrust are considered givens in Greek-Turkish relations, so is a series of mediations undertaken by various parties, during or after crises. This thesis reflects the two dominant explanations for the conflict, namely the realist and cultural arguments, on the future of the Greek-Turkish relations, based on observed crises between the two countries and their outcomes since 1955. Meinardus proposes three levels of analysis for the Greek-Turkish conflict by distinguishing between the domestic, regional and international dimensions (Constas, 1991, p.157). Crises provide us with unique opportunities to study the conflict in an integrative approach across all three levels of analysis.

In explaining conflict among societies a set of assumptions has to be made. Is it a natural phenomenon or an abnormality? Can we identify and analytically separate causes for conflictual behavior? How can we best manage a conflict? Answers to those questions a priori limit and guide our research. An overview of our “background answers” is necessary. It is assumed that conflict is an active phenomenon in all

² “Disagreement over Cyprus and the Aegean are at the basis of present hostility. Although both parties usually formulate their claims in precise legal terms the disputes are essentially political and the issues are often dominated by nationalistic perceptions and historically defined attitudes.” (Constas, 1991, p.79)

societies. Conflict studies by Mitchell analyze any conflict situation in three inter-related components of conflict situation, conflict behavior and conflict attitudes (Mitchell, 1994). For our work it is important to note his integrative approach towards the relevance of situational as well as psychological factors in a conflict. Goal incompatibility attributed either to existing value systems or to perceptions of scarcity matters the same, even if it has to be treated differently for successful conflict resolution. Mitchell also observes that conflict is a dynamic phenomenon whose components do not remain unchanged over time. Keashly and Fisher observe four stages of conflict escalation based on both objective and subjective factors: discussion, polarization, segregation, and destruction (Bercovitch, 1996, p.243). The Cyprus conflict becomes a remarkable example of this continuum. Optimists argue that the process is reversible. Pessimists focus on the next “destruction.” Dynamics of crises across time will provide us with the concepts of stability and equilibrium: Stability portrays the quantity of changes in a system; equilibrium characterizes their quality (Brecher and James, 1986, p.17). The distinction between the two is of importance to the Greek-Turkish conflict. Short-term remedies for stability harbor long term disequilibria as the continuity of crises suggests.

The question of immediate vs. underlying causes of a crisis has been with us since Thucidides. It presupposes a realist perspective and the identification of national interests. The realist perspective endows power distributions with a greater explanatory power than personal or systemic explanations. It focuses on threats, opportunities and balance of power concepts (Epetirida, 1996, p.17). In the Greek-Turkish conflict, this

thesis proposes, the underlying causes of the crises can be traced to a change in the power outlook of the countries involved since the time international treaties codified the status quo as we know it today. The regime that the treaties of Lausanne(1923), Montreux(1936) and Paris(1947) created --and which is still active in the Aegean-- has to accommodate Turkey, a country with aspirations beyond its context. Continuously since 1930, but especially after the 1955 London Tripartite Conference for Cyprus, Turkey has seen its role enhanced in the area and is capitalizing on it to pursue its strategic goals (Bachel, 1990, p.193).

In Balkan politics great power intervention is a common and repeating theme. For our work intervention is seen in the broader context, as a concept which includes actions ranging from conciliation to peacekeeping (Bercovitch, 1996, p.241). Mediation is one of many alternatives but our case studies confirm the “power mediation” type as the most effective, at least for diffusing Greek-Turkish crises. This thesis also observes through the crises reviewed in Chapter II, that Greek and Turkish national interests have not been addressed as such, but have been taken into account only if they coincided with the interests of the mediators; otherwise they were at best nominally addressed, at worst ignored or even suppressed. The Cold War had provided an argument in favor of strengthening alliance cohesion against addressing national agendas. Greece in particular, in the aftermath of a destructive civil war, had seen its forces suppressing “the internal danger” instead of focusing on the Turkish threat (Constas, 1991, p.97). The paternalistic nature of bilateral relations among Greece, Turkey and the US has allowed its direct involvement in the political decision making of the two countries in order to

accommodate American security needs. A bad omen for a lasting and just US mediation remains the difference in priorities that Greek and Turkish security agendas have with those set by Washington. Convergence of national interests is of more importance than legality, according to the realist perspective. Only historical analysis can provide the necessary background for supporting the above arguments.

Mediation efforts have focused historically on integration of the two countries within a single geopolitical entity. NATO policy towards the Greek-Turkish conflict is the best example of such an approach. In light of the hypotheses stated above, this approach presents us with a paradox. How can such diverse and conflicting core interests be satisfied within the concept of solidarity normally found in allied behavior? NATO has suffered from Greek-Turkish differences as much as it has been unable to resolve those differences (Clarke, 1996). Many policy makers, not only in Washington but in Athens and in Ankara as well, propose a paradigm shift that focuses on a review of threat calculations between the countries, as stated by President Clinton in his speech at the EU-US Summit. They are keen to suggest a set of crisis escalation and confidence-building measures. Their assumption is that the core difference between the two countries is a threat perception which does not realistically reflect the intentions of both countries, since the cost of hostilities would be greater than any potential benefit. This thesis proposes that a paradigm shift that ignores the basic differences between the two countries, in cultural and social infrastructures and focuses only on maintaining short-term power relationships is not creating long-term stability. As much as power can explain “why,” it still can not resolve the “how.” “The recognition of intractable social

conflicts that appear to be resistant to many traditional efforts has challenged scholars and practitioners to expand their conceptualizations of the nature of conflict to include both objective aspects and more subjective or social-psychological elements.”

(Bercovitch, 1996, p.249)

The subjective component however should not be confused with references to tribalism. Balkan ghosts are not at work here and neither have they been in Bosnia. The recognition of the existence of two societies with conflicting interests and a long history of competition should not function as an analysis of the conflict itself. After all, interests change, a propensity to display a “warrior culture” is not typical for both countries, and subjective differences should be traced to different societal developments. In the volume The Politics of Democratic Consolidation, Malefakis writes: “...How can Turkey generally be compared to Italy when the latter eagerly accepted the printing press in the fifteenth century while it was only grudgingly admitted to the former in the nineteenth century?” The differences between the two countries do not arise out of a simple mistrust but are rooted in different values and aspirations. Value differences make approaches to reconciliation difficult to pursue. The realist argument sits on top of cultural substrata of different assumptions about what a state, a society and a citizen are. The leaderships of both countries do not act in vitro but rather have to cope with a cultural reality that has roots in the Ottoman era³. Crises analysis since 1955 reinforces the thesis and suggests that any successful conflict management effort has first to provide boundaries (not all

³ The development of states and societies in the Balkan peninsula owes much of its delay to the Ottoman era. Greece in that respect is a remarkable case which has undertaken the transition to modernity at an age where other European countries were already beyond the second industrial revolution, only to get integrated in the European core by the end of the 20th century

necessarily geographical), to satisfy realistic concerns, and then to promote integration on an issue-by-issue basis in order to provide opportunities for future détente. Again Keashly and Fisher warn us that “focusing on either the subjective or objective aspect exclusive of the other aspect may result in short-term or medium-term settlement, but for long term resolution to occur both objective and subjective elements must be addressed.” (Bercovitch, 1996, p.241) At least for the medium term it seems more realistic to address the security concerns of both countries while we provide for future approaches. Enforcing rapprochement through a supranational or international organization, acceptable by neither party as impartial or honest has proved ineffectual in the past.

B. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A brief overview of the long history of encounters the two people have had is a necessary introduction to any analysis of their behavior. Even though the scope of this thesis does not include a narrow, historical account of events, the historical record describes concisely both the realist and cultural components of the conflict, as well as puts any intervention attempt into perspective. From this ordinary realization an extraordinary debate has emerged in academic as well as policy making circles. Where does one set the beginning of the Greek-Turkish exchanges? This question could be viewed as the other side of the debate for the continuity of Ottoman foreign policy from the Sultans through the modern Turkish state. Even if our thesis considers events only since 1955, the rich experience of mostly --but not solely-- conflicting exchanges

between the two people forms a historical background that should not be overlooked. Historical events before 1955 have been used by both countries in justifying contemporary actions or foreign policy goals. And they are not alone. The London Times in January 1997, referring to a recent crisis in Cyprus, did not hesitate to address the issue in terms of the “Eastern question.”

The first encounter of Greek elements with Turkish tribes was recorded in 568 AD, during the reign of Byzantine Emperor Justinian II. Until 1453, the year of Constantinople’s sacking by the Ottoman Turks, relations were fluctuating from cooperation and sometimes alliance against common enemies, to border disputes and war with the eventual destruction of the Byzantine empire (Nicol, 1996). The subsequent Ottoman period has left many legacies to be found in modern times as well. It is important to note the implications of Ottoman rule to the modern Turkish and Greek states and their foreign policies, as well as to the cultural realities and myths in both sides of the Aegean. Many Turks, including late President Ozal, ascribe the reluctance of Europeans to include Turkey in a united Europe in its Ottoman past and its Muslim identity. Ahmaz, in his analysis of the modern Turkish state identifies two legacies from the Ottoman times. The concept of the warrior leader and that of the centralized state. Pangalos (now foreign minister of Greece) identifies the continuities of an “imperial posture and status” as well as a deficit in the western values of legality and human rights for the Turkish state. “Most Turkish and foreign scholars see the foundation of the Turkish Republic as the reorganization --albeit a radical reorganization-- of a remnant of the Ottoman empire.” (Mardin). Memories in Greece of the 400 year Ottoman

occupation, on the other hand, are reinforcing a stereotype of Turkey as expansionist and belligerent. It is also true that the Greek war for independence started the long process which led to the rebirth of the “sick man of Europe” in the modern Turkish state. However, it is an historical fact that Greeks from Constantinople were influential in Ottoman foreign policy, and that under the millet system Orthodox Christians were receiving a degree of controlled and unwarranted autonomy.

The nationalism of the 19th century, a product of the French revolution and Enlightenment, was the driving force in the creation of both the modern Greek and Turkish states. After its liberation the modern Greek state included barely one-quarter of all Greeks living in the Eastern Mediterranean. It launched an expansionist policy to integrate Greeks from the rest of the Ottoman empire into the new state. Due to its weaknesses and the incompatibility of its aims with those of the great power regarding the Eastern question, Greece did not win any territorial gains until the Balkan wars of 1912-1913. Some of the Aegean islands were liberated from Ottoman rule, but they remained a contentious issue both before and after the Balkan war settlements. Their fate was finally decided with the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 and reviewed in Montreux in 1936. In 1915 Cyprus was offered by Britain to induce Greece into the World War but Greece rejected the offer, only to enter the war later. The settlements of the Treaty of Sevres of 1920 reflected the backing of the Entente powers to a loyal ally headed by a resourceful politician, Venizelos. Greek control extended to Asia minor, where an expeditionary force was sent. Political infighting in Greece, a tired population from endless wars, the tilt in French, Italian and British policies towards Turkey and the

ascendancy of a nationalist Turk, Mustafa Kemal, to power brought about what Greeks have named “the Minor Asia catastrophe.” It is that very moment that Turks celebrate as the creation of their modern state.

The Treaty of Lausanne --which along with the treaty of Paris, signed after the end of the Second World War describe in effect the Greek-Turkish borders-- marked the beginning of a period of *détente*. It also marked the end of any further Greek aspirations for “*megali idea*.” It is interesting to explain why this *détente* occurred as it is also interesting to note some of the revisionist ideas about its validity and significance that tend to put the Greek-Turkish conciliation of the 1930 along a more realist perspective (Hidiroglou, 1995). A need “for peace at home, peace abroad” was not dictated by choice but by the necessity to consolidate the nascent Turkish republic. Some of Ataturk’s policies which allow for the revisionism in the examination of Greek-Turkish *détente* are the promotion of culturally expansionist theories (Turkish national theory of the sun), the existence of a coordinated effort to “rewrite” history by eliminating any Greek tradition, dating back to Homer, and by some anti-Greek diatribes attributed to him, or sponsored by him (Hidiroglou, 1995, pp.29-31).

During the Second World War and immediately after it at the Paris peace conference, Turkey was pressing for a change in the status of the Aegean, albeit unsuccessfully. After the end of the war the Dodecanese islands were transferred to Greece from Italy, making the Aegean a Greek sea, politically and otherwise. The US emerged as one of the superpowers in the region. The Soviet threat and the Truman doctrine brought Greece and Turkey closer together. A second period of friendly and

cooperative relations that followed the Second World War can be more easily explained by the realist emphasis on the overwhelming Soviet threat and the relative weakness of both states. In 1952 both countries joined NATO; in 1953 they signed a Treaty of friendship and Cooperation, and in 1954 they signed a formal Treaty of Alliance. In 1955, there occurs a break to the concept of Greek-Turkish friendship. It remains to be seen if it has been permanent.

C. METHODOLOGY

After a brief historical overview of Greek-Turkish relations and a review on the bibliography on Greek-Turkish relations, the first part of the analysis is based on the case studies of crises. The selection of crises as a subject of study is based on the assumption that in crises one can observe policy choices which display the national interest, constrained by the structure of the international system as well as by domestic factors. The thesis also makes use of the concepts forwarded by George, Smoke, Lebow and Stein for theory formulation in the field of crisis management and deterrence theory.⁴ A description of theories of crisis management is found in Richardson⁵ (Richardson, 1994). Briefly, in the Greek-Turkish conflict we are examining a sub-limited level of relations -- compared to the superpower exchanges-- therefore, we lack an extensive body of

⁴ For a discussion see World Politics Vol. XLI, January 1989. *The Rational Deterrence Debate: A Symposium*

⁵ His taxonomy of theories on crises is: (1) rational choice theories (2) Psychological theories of decision making (3) political theories, including bureaucratic politics, (4) theories of adversary interaction and (5) systemic and deterministic theories

theoretical knowledge to properly define theories and laws. Instead, we are comparing generalizations found in relevant crisis management studies with the insight of historical analysis to validate or reject them. Our approach follows the method of Alexander George in Avoiding War: Problems of Crisis Management.

What is an international crisis? Available definitions seem complementary to one another and one needs to integrate them in order to operationalize crisis characteristics beyond the strictest of analytical examinations. Richardson defines crisis as an “acute conflict between two or more states, associated with a specific issue and involving a perception by decision makers of a serious risk of war.” (Richardson, 1994) His definition is an improvement on a Snyder-Diesing definition describing international crisis as “a sequence of interactions between the governments of two or more sovereign states in severe conflict, short of actual war but involving the perception of a dangerously high probability of war.” (Richardson, 1994) Richardson includes perceptions as an element of crises at a more general level and escapes from the narrow, game theoretic notion of sequential moves. Furthermore, he focuses on the “issue” which is the perceived basis for the crisis.

Systems analysis has provided us with a different view of the international system. Brecher defines international crisis as “...a situational change in an international system characterized by two individually necessary and collectively sufficient conditions: (1) distortion in the type and an increase in the intensity of disruptive interactions, with a high probability of military hostilities; and (2) a challenge to the existing structure of the system.” (Brecher and James, 1986) Bell identifies crises as “...turning points in

relations among states.” (Richardson, 1994) Those definitions focus on the changes induced by the crisis, however they miss the question of the origins of crises. To fill the gap for our analysis we borrow from Lebow his “...three operational criteria: (1) Policy-makers perceive that the action or threatened action of another international actor seriously impairs concrete national interests, the country’s bargaining reputation, or their own ability to remain in power; (2) Policy-makers perceive that any actions on their part designed to counter this threat (capitulation aside) will raise a significant prospect of war; (3) Policy makers perceive themselves to be acting under time constraints.”(Lebow, 1981, pp.10-12) Implicitly he assigns as plausible causes the national interests, reputation and domestic politics, without disregard for misperception. All of the above definitions (with the possible exception of Bell’s) point to the need for a three-phase analysis of crises: Origins, characteristics or dynamics and outcomes or lessons. Thus, our work will focus on those three aspects of the crises under examination.

The crises selected for analysis are; the 1955 crisis after the Istanbul pogrom events, the 1963-64 crisis in Cyprus after the inter-communal strife, the 1967 crisis again over Cyprus, the 1974 Turkish invasion of Cyprus, the series of crises between 1976 and 1978 over the Aegean, and the 1987 crisis in the Aegean. Those were the more intense, and as such on one hand posed the greatest threat to stability, and on the other have been covered extensively in various analyses. They also signify either branching points of historical development or have acquired high symbolic power in both countries, giving material for analysis on the question of outcomes. The 1996 crisis, even though it is important from both the theoretical as well as the policy making perspectives, could not

be sufficiently documented and therefore was not included here. It is a major drawback for the thesis since the 1996 crisis “exists” on a very different background than the rest of the crises and offers good opportunities for comparative analysis. Nonetheless for each of the other crises, we attempt to identify its origins and classify it after a typology by Lebow⁶. Characteristics for each crisis are evaluated with the help of three different analyses made by Richardson, Lebow and George.

Richardson examines international crises under different levels of analysis using what he calls “structuration theory.”(Richardson, 1994, p.350) For Richardson there is no preferred priority among levels of analysis. “Social structures persist only insofar as individual actors reproduce the multiplicity of practices which together constitute the structures. They are not absolute constraints, and in modern societies practices undergo constant modification as actors choose to vary them.”(Richardson, 1994, p.350) By placing the actor in the spotlight Richardson presents a scheme suitable for analyzing crises, where the decision-makers choose among different alternatives, constrained by situational or contextual factors. He provides us with a set of constraints and prerequisites for ideal crisis management. His constraints include the international system, the process in the choice of goals, perceptions, and crisis bargaining strategies. We test each case under consideration for the presence of those constraints and prerequisites. Their detailed list is shown in Appendix B, along with the findings from the case studies.

⁶ According to Lebow crises are categorized as one of the following: accidental, brinkmanship, spinoff and initiation of hostilities

Lebow provides us with a similar set of characteristics for international crises. He focuses on cognitive closure and crisis politics, misperception, and what he calls “the context of crisis.” George tests another set of hypotheses for effective crisis management. Furthermore, he proposes a set of strategies for the originator and the defender. For every case, based on analyses of the events, we identify the strategies used and the abstracted “personality type” of the decision-makers. Mediation efforts are another subject of our analysis. The “contingency” perspective on interventions by Keashly and Fisher is used to categorize intervention types (conciliation, consultation, pure mediation, power mediation, arbitration and peacekeeping) and their effectiveness.

In the second part of the study, a cross-crisis analysis is performed to identify continuities and discontinuities among them. This will provide the basis for accepting or rejecting the hypotheses stated in the introduction. On what factors can we attribute different outcomes for similar crises? Do we observe any continuities in the way the two countries react during crises? After the characteristics for every crisis and mediation attempt are collected under each of the analyses above, we will have a comprehensive view of different “pictures” of the Greek-Turkish crises and we might be able to answer the following questions: (1) What causes crises? Should we follow Thucydides in his view of the primacy of the underlying cause (interests) or revise him according to Lebow who insists on the primacy of the immediate causes (perception) for the explanation of the crisis origins? Do we observe any patterns in the underlying causes, which support the argument that they reflect power relationships, or do they suggest culture as the inhibiting factor for Greek-Turkish reconciliation? (2) Does there appear to be a more

successful mediation pattern among the methods used? What is the relation of the mediators' interest to that of the contending parties?

To make the logical process of generalization from case studies more apparent we have added the following figure (Fig.1). Here, one can see the interrelations among crisis type, conflict structure, crisis management and stability. An aftermath of every crisis, states usually re-examine their policies after a "learning process." Lebow, Brecher and James, in their analyses of international crises, deal with the effects of crises on the international system. Every crisis tests the hypothesis of system equilibrium. We "measure" post-crisis changes by answering two "yes/no" questions. Has the crisis affected stability? Has it affected the equilibrium? Stability is a measure of the quantity of changes. Equilibrium is an expression of their quality.




Figure 1. Model of Greek-Turkish crisis analysis

To answer the questions we consider Lebow: "...some crises have the effect of increasing tensions and convincing policy-makers that war is more likely in the future."(Lebow, 1981, p.315) According to Lebow, six hypotheses are contributing to that effect; post-crisis military preparations, the nature of coercive bargaining during the crisis and the initiator's willingness to accept war as an outcome of the crisis. The other considerations include the impact of the crisis upon domestic politics, the potential exacerbation of cleavages within a society and the frequency of the crisis. We examine every case study for the presence of those factors. Amelioration of hostilities is not impossible after an international crisis and deserves more attention for its implications on conflict management. Lebow suggests three major plausible explanations for post-crisis conflict reduction; defeat in a crisis could force policy-makers to re-evaluate their foreign policy assumptions, it could also diminish the impact on foreign policy making of hard-liners, or it could facilitate the settlement of outstanding issues. Fear of war and a promotion of empathy and trust among the parties could also achieve the same result. Figure 2 shows the links from each phase of the conflict to the next as a series of feedback loops.




Figure 2. Conflict process. From Lebow: Between Peace and War, 1981, p.337

The third part will attempt to integrate the findings of the research made in the first two parts, and provide us with some qualified insight into the nature (and the future) of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The third question therefore becomes: What are the dynamics of the conflict from a macro-view? That is the starting point for the final chapter of our work focusing on implications of the (mis)management of the conflict.

D. UTILITY

The importance of successful conflict management in the volatile Balkan region can not be overemphasized. It requires, however, a good understanding of the forces that are active in the area and will shape its future. Historical analysis provides the necessary depth and background for the policy maker. The Greek-Turkish conflict, even though it is rooted in history, can be explained by an analysis of power distribution and great power policies. Its management, however, is made possible only if one includes the cultural and societal components in one's calculus. The scope of this thesis is not to provide a historical test for the hypothesis that Greek-Turkish détente is possible; that would be too optimistic and arrogant. It argues, though, that only through a mixed policy of integration and boundary setting, and thus explicitly taking into consideration the security needs of the countries involved, will the two countries feel free to pursue friendly relations. If such a hypothesis is true, it might provide the decision makers with some insight into further issues arising from the conflict.

Success or failure in conflict management will have effects not only on Greece and Turkey. European integration, NATO expansion and the success of Partnership for Peace in the Balkan area are at stake. Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean would also be more secure with a relaxation of Greek-Turkish tensions. Moreover, future Greek-Turkish relations will have a marked effect on issues of international law and legality, on UNCLOS implementation and on the CSFP of the EU. The history of attempts to achieve peaceful settlements of disputes will almost certainly include the Greek-Turkish case either as a success or as a failure.

II. CASE STUDIES

A. 1955

After the end of the Second World War Greece and Turkey turned to the West, and more specifically to the US, for support. Announcement of the Truman Doctrine and substantial financial and military aid helped stabilize pro-Western governments in both states and consolidate American influence. In February 1952 both countries joined NATO after their initial request in 1950. Acceptance by the alliance was made easier after the Korean war. The move on behalf of Greece and Turkey was dictated not only by the Soviet threat, but by domestic factors as well⁷. Greek-Turkish détente seemed to be holding under the wider Western umbrella. Between April and June of 1952 the heads of state in Greece and Turkey exchanged official visits to signal closer cooperation. Following the Soviet-Tito rift in 1953 Greece and Turkey signed a Treaty of Friendship and Assistance with Yugoslavia⁸. During an official visit of the Greek Prime Minister to Ankara he stated along with his counterpart that "... there is no issue between the two countries that cannot be resolved in a friendly way." As late as 1954 the Greek Prime Minister was declaring that "the Greek Turkish friendship cannot be threatened or disturbed by the Cyprus question." (Alexandris, 1992, p.267) Both countries were seen as "... Siamese twins guarding the vital gates of warm water entry and exit into the Black

⁷ Robert McDonald in *Adelphi Papers* 229, London:IISS, Spring 1988, p.72

⁸ The pact lost any significance after 1955

Sea, and the soft underbelly of the Soviet Union.”(Couloumbis, 1983, p.24) The Republican administrations of President Eisenhower maintained excellent relations with both Greek and Turkish conservative governments of the time⁹.

Cyprus became the first issue to challenge alliance cohesion in the southeastern flank after 1955. The two communities on the island had established under Ottoman and British (after 1914) rule a relatively peaceful *modus vivendi*. The struggle of the Greek Cypriot majority to connect itself with mainland Greeks (*enosis*) was given impetus by a strong desire for self-determination earlier than other de-colonization trends which followed in the 1960s, a fact which inhibited early attempts for internationalization through the UN. Even though Great Britain had offered Cyprus as bait to a neutralist Greek government in 1915 for it to enter the Entente ranks during the First World War, after 1931 London had appeared determined to maintain control of the strategically located island¹⁰. Cyprus had become a Crown colony in 1925. Yet there existed at the same time a growing sentiment for Cypriot self-determination. In January 1950 Archbishop Makarios had organized a plebiscite in Greek Cypriot churches for or against union. 96% of eligible Greek Cypriot voted for *enosis* (Bahcheli, 1990, p.33). The Greek government came under pressure from Makarios to clearly support the Cypriot cause. However, it adopted a wait and see policy much influenced by British and US reactions. Also, since it did not consider the Turkish side as having a legitimate right on the future of the Cyprus question, it had stubbornly ignored planning for such an event.

⁹ Papagos (1952-1955) in Greece and Menderes in Turkey

¹⁰ In 1931 a Greek uprising was met with violence from the colonial forces. (Couloumbis, 1983, p.27)

Greek assumptions in formulating a foreign policy were the given desire of the Cypriots for union with Greece and the concept of the Cypriot case as a problem between Great Britain and Greece. If the first assumption was valid the second ignored important factors¹¹. A former Greek Prime Minister has stated: "Up to the middle of 1955, the Turkish factor was conspicuously absent from the planning of our Cyprus policy. Since Turkey had, by the Treaty of Lausanne, relinquished her rights on the island, it was considered in Athens that she had no role to play in our quarrel with Britain. The argument was legally irreproachable, but politically questionable." (Theodoropoulos, 1988, p.35)

The British argued for a "domestic affair" and included the Turkish side in the conflict as a measure against the Greeks. Strategic calculations made by the British before the Suez crisis assigned an unacceptable cost to the loss of Cyprus, with important implications on their position in the Middle East. The Turkish side felt that the prospect of a Greek "annexation" of Cyprus would be against long-term Turkish security interests in the area (Bahcheli, 1990, p.31). According to some authors it intensified the Cretan complex in Turkish foreign policy¹². The transfer of sovereignty for the Dodecanese to Greece after the Second World War stirred the same feelings but Turkey was unable at the time to bargain (Bahcheli, 1990, p.31). Illuminating for Turkish foreign policy objectives of the period is a long declaration made by President Menderes on 24 August

¹¹ Theodoropoulos, 1988, p.252. Those factors were; the prominent position given to the Turkish Cypriot community by the British, a formal protest by Turkey dating to the second world war towards the British and 1949 towards the Americans, a strong public opinion against enosis and positions taken by all Turkish parties on the matter

¹² Michalopoulos, 1989, p.71, and Theodoropoulos, 1988. Loss of Crete at the turn of the century to Greece has always been resented by Turkey

1955 (Michalopoulos, 1989). To avoid any misunderstanding Turkey sent a message to Athens in February 1954 stating as unacceptable the option of *enosis* to Turkish strategic interests (Theodoropoulos, 1988). Later, as a minimum, Turks advocated the status quo and for the first time the word partition (in Turkish *taksim*) entered the Cyprus argumentation. In a remarkably prophetic quote in 1951 the Turkish Foreign Minister said “Should any changes in the existing arrangements be seriously considered, we shall not permit such changes to take place without our participation and due regard for our rights.” (Theodoropoulos, 1988, p.36)

The US at the time viewed the Cypriot demand for independence and union with Greece in terms of its relation with Great Britain, Greece and Turkey, more as a potential problem than anything else (Stearns, 1992). The US position was viewed as more pro-British, seeking to diffuse the coming crisis and pressing the Greek side for an accommodation within the NATO family. “Cyprus was a distraction from the overriding need to contain Soviet expansion.” (Stearns, 1992, p.26) Michalopoulos argues three main points for US foreign policy at the time: Cyprus was considered a trilateral British-Greek-Turkish problem; regional stability was more important than Greek national considerations; and the British policy of denying independence fell within the UN premises (Michalopoulos, 1989, p.68). In effect, the US was against any internationalization of the Cypriot issue for the fear of including the Soviets in the matter (Couloumbis and Iatrides, 1980). The Turkish side played on American worries about the Soviets by stressing the “...seriousness of the threats to the very existence of the free

world” and calling it “...imperative for all free and friendly nations to stand together unreservedly”(Couloumbis and Iatrides, 1980, p.36).

Greek politicians in the early years after the war, feeling the weakness of the country, tried to align their policies with Great Britain and the US. Domestic pressure, the blunt rejection by Eden of any possibility of *enosis* to Papagos and the decline of British influence in the area allowed Greece to bring international attention to the matter. The Greeks, feeling outnumbered in the alliance, preferred the internationalization of the problem through the UN. Greece opted for both political pressure (1954) in the UN to support *enosis* and military struggle in Cyprus (April 1955) against the colonial rulers.

The British did organize in August 1955 a Tripartite Conference in London to find common ground among the parties involved in Cyprus. Archbishop Makarios, whom Turkish analysts portray as the key persona behind the union struggle(Bahcheli, 1990, p.34), was highly critical of the conference, stating that it was introducing Turkey as party to the Cyprus dispute with a say on the island’s future. Greeks attended the conference reluctantly, for not to accept would support Turkish charges of intransigence (Bahcheli, 1990, p.38). Issue linkage was evident in the talks of the conference as the Turkish side used the Muslim minority in Western Thrace as a diplomatic asset comparable to that of the Greek Cypriots. Requests for their right to self-determination were made in support of arguments against the self-determination of Greek Cypriots. The conference ended with no results as anti-Greek riots were taking place in Istanbul. As news of the riots reached the conference the Greek delegation withdrew and a complete breakdown occurred in Greek-Turkish relations.

On 6 September 1955 Turkish citizen groups attacked and destroyed the property of Greeks in Istanbul and Izmir. A group of extreme nationalists called “Cyprus in Turkish” deliberately stimulated anti-Greek emotions (Alexandris, 1992, p.254). The vandalism was not confined to property but involved loss of human life, desecration of graves and destruction of 73 out of 80 Greek churches in the city. One fact with important foreign policy implications in the Turkish approach against Greeks in Constantinople and the Patriarchate was Stalin’s death. Alexandris proposes the diminished Turkish fears of a Russian attack as a catalyst for the events that followed. Even though it might have been of secondary importance, one can not disqualify it completely. Two main issues should be remembered about the riots. First, they were sponsored or at least planned and supported by the government, and they signified the status of the Greek minority as a hostage for subsequent crises¹³. After 1955 the number of Greeks in Turkey rapidly declined, and today for all practical purposes there is almost no Greek minority left. Menderes is quoted as saying: “Zorlu’s job at London is to push the Turkish case and torpedo the conference. Zorlu wants us to be active in Turkey.¹⁴” A former member of the Turkish delegation to NATO told the court (against Menderes) that Foreign Minister Zorlu sent a telegram from London to Ankara stating that “The British seem to be inclining towards self-determination for Cyprus...It is necessary that

¹³ The Turkish junta of 1960 in the Yassıada trials implicated Menderes (Prime Minister during the riots) and his Foreign Minister Zorlu, as responsible for the riots. The prosecution alleged that they were responsible for staging a provocation in Thessaloniki against Atatürk’s birthplace to ignite events in Constantinople

¹⁴ Stated in evidence during the trials mentioned above. Alexandris, 1992, p.264

the premier takes appropriate steps to support my position”¹⁵.

The Greek reaction to the events was a strong verbal protest, and a written protest some days later. Papagos, the Greek Prime Minister was terminally ill¹⁶. The crisis and its aftermath were still handled by him and the next Prime Minister Karamanlis. The Greek officers serving in Izmir at the regional command center were ordered back to Athens. Greek vessels withdrew from NATO maneuvers and the Prime Minister (Karamanlis) ordered the return of the Greek detachment in Korea. He further requested suspension of extraterritorial agreements for US personnel stationed in Greece and rejected American humanitarian aid after some floods. He also requested moral and material compensation after the events (Michalopoulos, 1989, p.9). It appears that the Greek government was surprised by the strong Turkish reaction to the Greek struggle for *enosis*. Under fire from an opposition calling for its resignation, the Greek government declared its intention to reexamine the future of Greek-Turkish relations. NATO's permanent secretaries met in a special session on 8 September 1955 to consider the situation, but nothing substantial was produced.

The Eisenhower administration reacted to events with a balanced response towards Greece and Turkey, which minimized the significance of the events themselves and stressed the importance of alliance cohesion. The American Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in identical notes urged both the Greek and Turkish premiers to refrain from allowing those unhappy events destroy the partnership of the two nations

¹⁵ Ibid. Zorlu during the trial did not deny the telegram but has explained the appropriate steps as normal diplomatic demarches

¹⁶ He died on 4 October 1955

(Alexandris, 1992, p.267) and provided suggestions for the two nations to mend their fences (Couloumbis, 1983, p.29). The letters were a result of bureaucratic infighting within the State Department and not a product of a coherent foreign policy (Stearns, 1992, p.29). Such wording caused anti-American sentiments in Greece and some Greek newspapers referred to the letter as blackmail, since in the letter there was a subtle reference to US aid (Stearns, 1992, p.32). Official Greek and Turkish reactions to the letters were diametrically opposed. Turkish Prime Minister Menderes found “great satisfaction” where the Greek Prime Minister Papagos observed that “your message does not correspond to the true development of events.” American commentators were also critical of the administration’s position (Stearns, 1992). The only official voice from a US perspective which came closer to the Greek positions was a comment by CINCSOUTH, Admiral William M. Fechtler: “I thoroughly understand the Greek viewpoint. We want to cure the situation.” (Stearns, 1992, p.34)

The crisis did not end with the end of the riots. New items that surfaced as points of friction between Greece and Turkey were the status of the Patriarchate and the protection of the Greek minority in Turkey. Indicative of the mood in the security field of the time is a pamphlet published after the Cyprus conflict of 1955 and attributed to Greek Foreign Minister Averoff. It included a perception of possible Turkish military actions in the Aegean, with time constraints set for the Greek reaction and described possible Greek reactions after a further Turkish provocation. It is important to note some lines from the last paragraph of the pamphlet: “since Greece’s honor would have been at stake, and as the military undertaking against Constantinople would have been difficult,

the Greek government would have sought assistance from any party that might be interested to see Turkey removed from the Straits” (Alexandris, 1992, p.268). The same Foreign Minister suggested that a possible way out of the conflict was an exchange of population between Turkish Cypriots and Constantinopolitan Greeks¹⁷. Such a proposition was not of interest to the Turks, however, since their interest in Cyprus was and is strategic and not demographic. Furthermore the British administration in Cyprus was making extensive use of Turkish Cypriots against EOKA (the nationalistic organization for *enosis*). Inter-communal killings began in 1956 and the Turkish side changed strategies from anti-union to pro-partition (Bahcheli, 1990, p.39). The British side saw a turning point in its Cyprus policy after the Suez crisis. Cyprus, was important but not sufficient for a successful Middle Eastern policy. Realization of that fact alone allowed a British flexibility on the issue of Cypriot independence (Stearns, 1992, p.27).

B. 1963-1964

The 1963-1964 crisis can not be understood without recounting the events which led to the signing of the London and Zurich agreements. It was the product of an unworkable constitutional structure created by those agreements and by the real conflict between Turkish security interests and an independent Cypriot state. After 1955 EOKA, the Greek-Cypriot underground organization, intensified its struggle for independence. At the same time British officials proposed a series of plans that were rejected by one or

¹⁷ Suggestion made to the American Ambassador in Greece George Allen. Alexandris, 1992, p.272

more of the parties¹⁸. In 1958 after intense intra-communal fighting and with the post-Suez realization that British interests could be well served by having sovereign bases on instead of sovereignty for Cyprus, there was pressure on Greece and Turkey to negotiate a Cyprus solution (Bacheli, 1990, p.43). As Couloumbis writes, "... what began in 1954 as a British-Greek dispute over Cypriot self determination had been transformed by 1959 into a dangerous Greek Turkish bilateral dispute over the future of Cyprus." (Bacheli, 1990) Internationally there was increased tension in East-West relations after realization of Russian ICBM capabilities (Sputnik), and the Berlin crisis. After the Cuban crisis of 1962 relations between the two superpowers became more stable as a consequence of mutual assured destruction envisaged in the case of a nuclear war. Systemically this led to friction within the blocks, as the French-US and the Soviet-Czechoslovakian cases indicated¹⁹. Regional tensions resurfaced and the Greek-Turkish conflict entered a new era since economic and political reconstruction in both countries was well under way (Couloumbis, 1983, p.42).

The semantics of the agreement involved the forum where it was conducted (NATO partners instead of UN involvement in an international issue) and the balance of powers reflected in the newly-formed state's constitution. Compromise produced an ineffective constitution which provided for an independent Cyprus, even though extensive intervention rights were granted to the three Guarantor powers, thus

¹⁸ Harting 1955, Radcliff 1956, McMillan 1958

¹⁹ France under De Gaulle loosened its NATO ties where the Soviet Union intervened militarily to check the Dubcek regime

formalizing Turkish stakes in the island well beyond the welfare of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. The most contentious issues in the constitution were the percentage of Turkish Cypriots accepted in public service, municipalities' organization, and the veto powers granted to the Turkish community in the executive and legislative branches. Indeed, by effectively using his veto powers, the Turkish Vice President did not allow for the creation of a unified Army and obstructed some taxation measures. It became evident that the constitution itself supported separatist and not integrationist ideals (Couloumbis, 1980).

After signing the agreements the Greek government was heavily criticized by the opposition. Since Greece was democratic at the time, its leaders were pressured by domestic unrest for a heated issue. Alliance commitments and pressures, on the other hand, were arriving along with foreign aid, and acted as a force for compromise. The treaties posed a challenge to the Greek side greater than to the Turkish (Bachel, 1990, p.51). The primacy and bluntness of interventionism by Britain and to an extent by the US marked the foreign policy decisions of both countries. Turkish governments were more able to pursue their security agenda since their interests coincided with those of the British and were against the Greek "revisionism." The Turkish military which had intervened with a coup in 1960, shortly after the ratification of the London agreements, pledged to respect them. It showed a remarkable and commendable continuity in foreign policy. Public support for Turkish intervention in Cyprus was also strong (Ahmaz, 1993, p.140).

Inter-communal violence in Cyprus in December 1963 reached a high point following a proposal by the Cypriot President (Archbishop Makarios) to amend the constitution²⁰. Makarios had since 1962 declared his intention to change the constitution, as Turkish analysts point out (Bachel, 1990, p.56). A series of representations was made by the Turkish government to the Greek regarding Cyprus. At the same time Turkish Cypriots prepared their own plans for reprisals in kind, thus effectively negating efforts from the mainland governments to diffuse tensions (Bachel, 1990). Nevertheless the answer to the Cypriot President did not come from his own Turkish-Cypriot Vice President but directly from Ankara. Turkish Air Force planes conducted overflights and Greece opted for a non-NATO politically advantageous solution under the framework of the UN (Bachel, 1990). A British initiative had failed in February and the US was asked to assist in conflict resolution. After a series of successful mediation efforts by US envoy George Ball, the December crisis was diffused (Stearns, 1992). The nature of “shuttle diplomacy” and the lack of in-depth analysis of the regional factor doomed the US intervention to a fire fighting, short-term role (Stearns, 1992). The first UNFICYP (United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) was established on the island in March 1964. In March 1964 the Turkish Foreign Ministry announced that Turkey was abrogating a 1930 agreement with Greece concerning the status of ethnic Greeks in Turkey. Expulsions were conducted, and they were directly related to the Cyprus crisis²¹. In April and May the Turkish Government introduced measures that resulted in the

²⁰ The amendment became known as the thirteen point amendment

²¹ Statement by the Turkish government spokesman: “unless the Greek government changed its attitude in regard to the question in Cyprus, all the Greek nationals in Istanbul might be expelled en masse” Alexandris, p.282

Turkification of the Aegean islands of Imvros and Tenedos, whose status was protected under the Lausanne Treaty. Greece did not reciprocate with the Muslim minority in Thrace, but to balance the situation, initiated in July an agreement with Bulgaria to settle some of the outstanding differences between the two nations. Since the Balkan wars, Greek, Bulgarian and Turkish efforts in diplomacy aimed in belonging in the group of two against the one (Valinakis, 1989, p.104).

Makarios in April denounced the Treaties of Guarantees, stressing the need for Cypriot independence. Turkish reaction was prompt, threatening invasion even though President Inonu felt it was unable to undertake such an operation. The crisis ended with actual fighting between the two communities in August with civilian losses on both sides. At the time Greece did send fighter jets to support Greek Cypriot positions when under fire by Turkish planes, but they conducted only overflights to boost morale, without engaging after strict orders from the Greek political leadership, since a UN resolution calling for a cease fire was in effect (Garoufalias, 1982, p.164). However, earlier political changes in Athens (the coming to power of George Papandreou) led to some important revisions in foreign policy. Most notably the Greek Government authorized the stationing of an army regiment on the island to provide for a triggering mechanism against further Turkish interventionism. The Greek deterrent policy is noteworthy in view of current developments in Greek-Turkish relations. The Turkish press at the time pictured the Greek decision as negating any Turkish interests in the island. Turkish and NATO reaction was strongly against the deployment but the Greek Prime Minister

insisted on the validity of his decision when confronted by President Johnson during their meeting in summer 1964.

American intervention in this crisis alienated the Turkish side after the famous Johnson letter (5 June 1964) to Inonu²². His prompt response could be attributed to the two-month-old and thereafter permanent presence of Soviet naval units in the Mediterranean (Valinakis, 1989, p.102). Nonetheless Moscow did not welcome Turkish threats. Johnson wrote: “I hope you will understand that your NATO allies have not had a chance to consider whether they have an obligation to protect Turkey against the Soviet Union if Turkey takes a step which results in Soviet intervention without the full consent and understanding of its NATO allies.” (Bacheli, 1990, p.63) Direct Turkish intervention on the island through a possible invasion was avoided after that letter. Justification for the harsh tone by Johnson only outraged the Greek side. “But surely you know that our policy has caused the liveliest resentment in Athens and has led to a basic alienation between the US and Archbishop Makarios.” (Stearns, 1992, p.38) Most analysts posit that Turkish-American relations were adversely affected by this incident. Another not so well known intervention was undertaken by NATO and General Lemnitzer. He went to Ankara during January 1964 and sent urgent messages to the Turkish General Staff after he received information on a pending Turkish invasion of Cyprus. His efforts mark the existence of parallel communication structures, which during crises need careful coordination, a lesson revisited at the 1974 crisis.

²² Similarity with the Dulles letters is remarkable in their reasoning and argumentation as well as to the effects of alienation of allies

As a result of the Johnson letter and the Jupiter missiles removal from Turkey during the Cuban missile crisis, a more independent Turkish foreign policy was undertaken. US reconnaissance flights from Turkish soil were suspended in 1965. The Turkish government eventually denied use of Turkish bases to American ships and aircraft for refueling or supply activities during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The same denial came in 1973 (Kuniholm, 1985). Such denials were not effective during the 1958 Lebanon civil war. Turkey initiated a diplomatic and economic approach towards the Soviet Union, with implications for the rearmament of Cyprus. In the 1970's Turkey was one of the largest recipients of Soviet economic aid outside the Warsaw pact.

American support for a solution to the Cyprus problem came also from Dean Acheson with the "Acheson Plan."²³ The plan served primarily Western interests by placing Cyprus outside the non-aligned sphere and into NATO, while neutralizing Makarios. Prevention of the establishment of a Soviet satellite state in the Eastern Mediterranean was an objective of US foreign policy (Stearns, 1992, p.36). It was rejected by the Greek side, pressed by Makarios, even though at some point the mainland Greek government considered it seriously and had been favorable to it. From the Greek perspective, a struggle for primacy in decision making existed between Nicosia and Athens, evident from the first days of the *enosis* struggle. Lack of coordination and sometimes (after 1967) competition in the diplomatic and military fronts resulted in disaster. Stearns points out that Makarios appeared "non-aligned" with Greece as well as

²³ It included provisions for the dissolution of the state of Cyprus and the effective partitioning of the island under the concept of double *enosis*. What is surprising is the relation it has with current political realities on the subject. Couloumbis, 1983, p.46

with the superpowers. In a little-known historical episode, the Greek government went at pains to prevent Cypriots from acquiring Russian SAM missiles (Eleftherotypia, 10 January, 1997). The Greek government rejected the plan during Papandreou's visit to Washington in the summer of 1964. Some analysts connect his downfall with American resentment for his arrogant stance against Johnson and his rejection of the Acheson plan for Cyprus (Couloubis, 1983). The foreign policy record of the Greek junta supports those claims. After some concessions made by the colonels to Turkey²⁴, the Turkish side recognized the Greek regime in 1968, the only country to do so besides Congo-Kinshasa (Alexandris, 1992).

C. 1967

After the 1964 crisis two independent diplomatic initiatives for resolving the Cyprus situation were active. Under UN auspices mediator Gallo Plaza in 1965 published his report, which was rejected by all parties. The same year the UN General Assembly called for respect of the sovereignty, unity, independence and territorial integrity of the Cypriot Republic. The second diplomatic initiative involved triangular contacts between Washington, Athens and Turkey on plans drafted with British assistance (Valinakis, 1989, p.108). In December 1966 a Protocol was signed in Paris between Greece and Turkey. Turkey consented to a form of *enosis* in exchange for acquiring sovereign rights at a military base in Cyprus, while the rest of the island had to

²⁴ The most important one was the withdrawal of Greek troops from Cyprus

be demilitarized. The Greek coup of 1967 brought a group of colonels to power in Athens and caused in Ankara a re-evaluation of foreign policy. Even as the colonels submitted a proposal in September 1967 along the lines of the 1966 Protocol, a proposal similar to the Acheson plan, the Turkish side requested full partition or return to the status described by the London and Zurich Agreements. Any understanding achieved up to that time failed.

Lack of compromise should have been expected as the Greek side after the coup was weak both internally and internationally, and the Turkish side was keen on raising its bid. The Greek government was facing European reaction to the coup and a US embargo of weapons²⁵. European reaction came through pressure for a return to parliamentary democracy, human rights and economic measures imposed by the European Community but not followed by national governments (Valinakis, 1989). American reaction to the coup was influenced by American security needs. Richard Nixon is quoted in the New York Times of 28 July 1967 as defending the viability of a policy safeguarding Israel's security with assistance to Greece and Turkey. Lack of substantial preparation by Greece and Turkey as well as absence of clear American support for the plan further undermined the September initiative.

It is interesting to note that consultations between the Greek and Turkish governments were not conducted with the participation of Archbishop Makarios. Relations between Athens and Nicosia had not been without troubles during the Papandreou premiership, but the military junta supported a nationalistic strategy of

²⁵ The embargo was lifted silently after the May 1967 six day Arab-Israeli war

Athens dictating the future of “Hellenes.” Thus, the colonels attempted to monopolize responsibility for any developments in the Cypriot case and undermined Makarios by using the National Guard and the Greek forces stationed on the island. On the public record nonetheless, they appeared cooperative with Makarios (Valinakis, 1989). The military leader of Greek forces in Cyprus, Grivas, was in continuous disagreement with Makarios, with grave implications for the Greek-Cypriot community²⁶.

In November 1967, after the failed September talks, Colonel Grivas with the consent of the colonels launched an attack on two Turkish Cypriot villages, following a minor incident. Turkish reaction was immediate and included the threat of an invasion, conduct of overflights by the Turkish Air Force and authorization by the Turkish National Assembly for the conduct of military operations outside Turkey. The New York Times reported on 29 November 1967: (Bachel, 1990, p.73)

The Turks see the moment ripe to get back at the Greeks for all the injury and insult they feel they have suffered in Cyprus since the US in effect prevented them from invading after communal fighting in December, 1963. Now is the time, the Turks say, for the security of their minority on the island to be assured for once and all, by agreement if possible, by war if necessary.

The sequence of Turkish reactions confirmed a pattern of characteristics in the Cyprus situation which remained constant until 1974 (Theodoropoulos, 1988). Cyprus did not have complete sovereignty of the island, and the question of how much territory was beyond its control was a question of quantitative and not qualitative difference. Along with the weakening in the position of the Turkish Cypriot minority there was a counterbalancing strengthening of the Turkish position and ultimata through the threat or

²⁶ Makarios in 1966 has asked for a limitation of responsibilities assigned to Grivas

use of force. Also, the Greek positions on the matter fluctuated and there was not one consistent strategy followed.

Intense diplomatic activity followed the Turkish threat²⁷. At three different levels the international community reacted, mostly after US initiatives. The UN with special envoy Rolz-Bennet, NATO with Secretary General Brosio and the US with Cyrus Vance tried to prevent general hostilities. Cyrus Vance was finally credited with the avoidance of further engagements between Greek and Turkish forces. One more “fire-fighting operation,” it was designed more to defuse a crisis than to resolve basic differences between the parties (Stearns, 1992, p.11). Agreement was reached on November 30, after what was to a large extent Greek compliance with Turkish demands. The Greek contingent of 10,000 men stationed in Cyprus had to be withdrawn, and Grivas had to return to mainland Greece. Reparations were to be given to the victim families, and more responsibilities were to be given to the UNFICYP (Sazanides, 1979). Turkey had to dissolve military formations opposite the Cypriot coast. It is interesting to consider why the Greek government complied with the Turkish demands. Bacheli proposes the view that even though Greece could not stand up to Turkey in an all out war it enjoyed local superiority and he searches for reasons beyond purely military considerations. He suggests that the colonels’ decision was based on a reluctance to engage Turkey after their proposals for Greek-Turkish friendship, their internal and international weaknesses, and their weak bargaining position due to an a priori orientation towards NATO and the

²⁷ Stearns reports the hastiness of Vance’s dispatch. From his notification for the mission until his departure from Washington passed no more than three hours and twenty minutes. (Stearns, 1992, p.12)

US, which many felt backing the regime. On the Turkish side Demirel was criticized at home for not carrying out the invasion, showing the difference in the strategic outlook of the two countries.

The 1967 crisis according to some was a turning point in Cypriot history (See n.91 in Bachelis, 1990). A period of disengagement from the affairs of the island by Greece and Turkey had started. Others view it as a continuum (1963-1974) from which we can draw similar lessons (Theodoropoulos, 1988). Immediately after the crisis both sides recognized the need for inter-communal talks. Greece was reluctant to continue in its provocative policy in the face of political weakness at home and abroad. Turkey gained strategic weight by eliminating the Greek deterrent from Cyprus, thus making possible the later invasion of 1974. The realization of the Turkish ability to exact concessions from Greece by establishing a credible threat was not lost by Ankara.

D. 1974

The setting for the 1974 crisis was completed after the 1967 crisis with the removal of the Greek contingent from Cyprus and the changes in the regional and international political realities of the early 1970s. In March 1971 the Turkish armed forces intervened in Turkey after a period of political unrest. The Athens junta attempted to approach the new Turkish government in an effort to resolve the Cyprus problem between the two military regimes. This approach was strongly criticized by Makarios due to the “closed doors” diplomacy adopted by Athens. Grivas’s underground return to

the island in 1971 created an acute crisis between Makarios and the colonels.

During 1973 the Turkish government issued oil exploration licenses for 27 areas in the Aegean Sea, some reaching up to the six-mile limit of Greek territorial sea²⁸. Greece itself had already issued such licenses for areas it considered were lying on its continental shelf since 1961 (Valinkais, 1989, p121). In June 1974 for the first time the Turkish side contended that an extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 nautical miles was a cause for war. The lack of preparedness by the Greek side to counter Turkish initiatives was demonstrated in the agenda of the meeting between the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers in December 1973. Continental shelf discussions were not conducted. The matter of the licenses was withheld from the Greek press and public until February 1974. Tensions were heightened with the dispatch of the Turkish vessel Candarli to conduct oceanographic research in the above-mentioned areas during June 1974. An exchange of diplomatic notes between the two countries offers us a series of political and legal argumentations, their changes in subsequent years reflecting changes in foreign policies²⁹. A series of Greek airspace violations by Turkish planes and anti-Greek demonstrations in Istanbul completed the setting for the upcoming crisis. There are two explanations for the timing of Turkish provocation: one focuses on the Realpolitik nature of Turkish foreign policy; the other argues that structural changes in the legal framework surrounding the contentious issues, coupled with their technical and

²⁸ Despite Greek verbal notes in June and July 1974 Turkey extended those areas

²⁹ Changes were made in Greek positions in an effort to appease the Turkish side

legal complexity and political tensions made the issues difficult to manage through normal channels and resulted in crisis. Both views merit consideration.

In March 1974 inter-communal talks in Cyprus were discontinued. They were undermined by their slow progress, the presence of extremist elements in Cyprus which destabilized the Cypriot government, and the manifested willingness by Athens to conduct direct talks with Ankara on a framework based on “double *enosis*” (Constas, 1989, p.75). It is ironic that talks between Turkish and Greek delegations on the constitutional future of Cyprus reached agreement 36 hours before the Turkish invasion (Constas, 1989, p.77). The beginning of the 1974 crisis is connected by many to the Makarios letter of 2 July 1974 to the Chief of Armed Forces, Gizikis. The Archbishop requested the removal of all Greek officers serving in the National Guard and the disbanding of the underground nationalistic organization supported by the regime in Athens, after two attempts against his life and rumors of an upcoming coup. The reply came in the 15 July coup against Makarios and the subsequent Turkish invasion (20 July) in support of the Treaties of Guarantees (1960)³⁰. The Turkish side maintained that it was conducting peace operations. Hostilities ended temporarily on the 22nd after an alleged threat by the US to withdraw its nuclear weapons from Turkey (Constas, 1989, p.112). By that time the Turkish armed forces were in control of a small portion of the island, which did not include all Turkish Cypriot communities. Important for the future

³⁰ “In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty”

of Cyprus talks was the inclusion in the cease-fire declaration of federal clauses for two autonomous administrations.

The US has been blamed for its failure to proactively constrain Ioannides, but any consideration of American involvement in the coup against Makarios has not been proven (Constas, 1989, p.107). Suspensions against American complicity resulted from the lack of support for Makarios, as the legitimate leader of the Cypriot state by the first American statements after the coup. The coup was a “terrible miscalculation” on the part of Ioannides, the junta’s strongman (Bachel, 1990, p.96). The status quo was altered beyond repair for Greek interests. It signified the end of the dream for *enosis*. Yet it signaled in many ways a new epoch for Greece, its democratic institutions and the realization of foreign policy truths and orientations outside the context of neocolonial relations. The pro-European choice was gaining ground against the pro-American approach.

From the Turkish side the right-wing Islamic fundamentalist party restrained the political space available for the social democrat Prime Minister Ecevit. It is not clear whether Ecevit would have pursued a different option if he had not had to appease Erbakan. Facing US Undersecretary of State J. Sisco who was trying to dissuade Ankara from intervening, Ecevit is quoted as saying: (Bachel, 1990, p.95)

Ten years ago... you committed an error and so did we. Your mistake was to tie our hands and stop us. Our mistake was that we listened to you. We will not commit the same error as ten years ago.

Some analysts have tried to analyze as irreconcilable the character of Ecevit and his handling of the crisis. He was a holder of a BA in literature and he was a social

democrat. He had translated works of T.S. Eliot and Ezra Pound into Turkish (Couloumbis, 1983). What this argumentation is missing is the importance of the security agenda in the Turkish foreign policy formulation and the overarching influence of the armed forces in decision making. Not to be forgotten is also the fact that Ecevit had been Kissinger's student (Ioannides, 1992, p.112). Ecevit resigned in September 1974 the same day that the US announced the arms embargo. However on the whole Turkish leaders have emerged triumphant from this crisis.

The Greek side was completely unprepared to militarily confront the Turks and Ioannides lost political control after the top ranking military officers rejected any notion of going to war with Turkey. Turkish analysis has recognized Greek unwillingness to commit itself to actual fighting during the 1964-1967 crises (Constas, 1989, p.78). Undersecretary of State Sisco had a hard time finding responsible officials in Athens to negotiate a settlement preceding the July 20 invasion (Couloumbis, 1983). Sisco had as his mission objectives the termination of hostilities (Constas, 1989, p.78), the prevention of conflict internationalization and the safeguarding of possibilities for constitutional arrangements (Constas, 1989, p.112).

The realities behind Sisco's mediation were a change in the international setting and the American political scene. Détente between the US and the USSR and the US and China allowed the US to escape from a fear of Soviet involvement in the Cypriot crisis. Stearns includes in his analysis of American indecisiveness during the crucial summer of 1974 the Watergate political crisis in Washington and the recent transfer of responsibility for the Greek-Turkish-Cypriot offices to the European desk in the State department 20

days before the invasion (Stearns, 1992, p.9). However, after the events in August the question for American policy was one of high policy choices and not one of bureaucratic efficiency.

After the failed American mediation many questioned the US stance, not only from a moral aspect, which could be irrelevant, but as a demonstration of America's diminishing influence in the region compared with what it has been in the previous decade³¹. A breakdown in US intelligence gave conflicting reports during the last hours before the coup (Ioannides, 1992). As a critic of Kissinger's foreign policy decisions before and during the crisis, Laurence Stern, has written: "And so while Kissinger's contribution was to purge American foreign policy of the Protestant missionary spirit with which Dulles had imbued it, his failure was in not understanding the imperatives of change among and within nations...An American foreign policy that fails to comprehend these forces may be doomed to sterility and failure." (Couloumbis, 1983). George Ball, commenting on 1974 US diplomacy, said: "The moral is clear: effective diplomacy for a great nation requires constant high-quality institutional vigilance. That is not possible when all decisions are pre-empted by an individual virtuoso with a lust for travel." (Stearns, 1992, p.36)

The post-invasion security environment reflected relative gains and losses for the parties involved. Ankara immediately argued that the London and Zurich agreements did not provide a margin of safety for the Turkish Cypriot community, and proposed either a bi-zonal federation or a loose multi-cantonal federation. Before getting Athens' response

³¹ Statements made by Kissinger that the State Department was taken by surprise were not convincing

to the above options, the last known as the Gures plan, Turkey in August completed the invasion by extending its grip to roughly 37% of the island, justifying it by citing the “security needs” for its forces. The second attack came after violation of the cease-fire negotiated in Geneva, effective August 8. After the second phase of operations and while Kissinger promised Turkish flexibility, Turkish Prime Minister Ecevit gave the real dimensions of the situation: a Turkish presence in Cyprus had been irrevocably established (Ioannides, 1992, p.115, and Bacheli, 1990, p.100).

Athens was intimidated once more and, at a moment of political chaos, took the drastic decision to withdraw from the military side of the Alliance. NATO on its part through its Secretary General (Luns), failed to accede to demands by Athens for an emergency meeting of the NAC³². The Turkish side had to confront a delayed arms embargo imposed by the US Congress in 1975 and opposed by all subsequent administrations. Ironically, the most successful operation undertaken by the Turkish military led to an international condemnation and political “defeat.” Important strategic gains were made however, both material and psychological. Following reports about the conduct of troops during the invasion and other reports of human rights violations, the European countries focused on human right conditions in Turkey and created an obstacle for further Turkish integration into Europe.

Decisions made during the negotiations that followed the 1974 events included the important step by Athens to internationalize the problem, to advocate a peaceful solution and the abandonment of a Palestinian-like struggle. The choice was a forced

³² The Secretary General was vacationing in the Black Forrest. (Stearns, 1992, p.68)

one in view of the stand taken by the international community, and it has led to an operational policy of compromise. The resultant economic success of the Greek-Cypriot approach has backfired in an interesting way. The US and other countries continue to call on Cyprus to assume the economic burden of developing the occupied territories as a peace investment and many both within and outside Cyprus appear unwilling to pursue a long-term struggle for liberation out of a fear of losing established gains (Couloumbis, 1980).

F. 1976

Following the 1974 crisis outstanding issues between Greece and Turkey were expanded to areas beyond Cyprus. The main axis of confrontation now became the Aegean, since Cyprus was developing independently of day to day policy decisions in Athens and Ankara. The extent of the Greek territorial sea and airspace, the delimitation of the continental shelf, the rearmament of the Greek islands, and NATO command and control arrangements together constitute the Aegean dispute which still plagues relations between the two countries. Issues become linked to one another, thereby allowing for opportunities or posing constraints on compromise, depending on the assumptions made of the nature of the conflict. East-West détente, reaching its apogee in the summer of 1975 with the Conference for Security and Cooperation for Europe (CSCE), resulted in threat re-evaluations from the Greek side (Valinakis, 1989, p.192).

The Aegean dispute is a result of conflicting core interests, a zero-sum game mentality and an analytical primacy of politico-military instead of politico-economic strategic considerations (Stearns, 1992). Security issues become more and more important as continual crises threaten peace. Mediation or compromise becomes difficult because of two different approaches to the contending issues adopted by the two countries. Greece insists on a legalistic analysis since international law is seen as supportive of Greek positions. Turkey favors a political basis for compromise, the concept of “equity,” which best reflects power and status realities (Bacheli, 1990, p.132). Here, it is not intended to analyze the issues. We focus on events from three different crises in the post-1974 era which signify three different epochs. In 1976 a conservative government in Greece and a weak government in Turkey face an Aegean crisis. In 1987 a socialist Greek cabinet faces an Aegean crisis against a Turkish President modernizing his country. And in 1996 we observe the first serious Greek-Turkish crisis in the post-Cold War environment. Theses in Greek-Turkish relations abound with arguments for continuities and discontinuities. In this context, it is interesting to examine the outcomes of those crises.

In 1975 Greece and Turkey failed to settle the continental shelf issue, which had arisen in 1973, through the International Court of Justice. Turkey had not agreed to submit its case, backing off from a previous position, under intense political pressure. Turkish political leaders were keen to recognize that existing international law and legal precedent favored Greece even if not all cases did so (Stearns, 1992, p.136 and Bacheli, 1990). Responding to nationalistic pressures the Turkish government “...decided to re-

assert Turkish claims in the Aegean” by conducting seismic research in “disputed” waters (Bacheli, 1990, p.134).

In February 1976 the Turkish side proposed a “package deal” for all outstanding issues between Greece and Turkey. In parallel, naval exercises were conducted by Turkish forces in the Aegean at the same time that the convention for the new law of the seas was meeting in Geneva (Sazanides, 1979, pp.80-82). Later, in April 1976, the Greek Prime Minister proposed an accord for not resorting to violence and for exchanges in armaments information, which was turned down on the grounds of already existing commitments through the NATO alliance. Only the US could put some pressure effectively on the Turkish side. After the embargo of weapons the Turks reciprocated instead of yielding and denied use of American bases and facilities in Turkey (Woodhouse, 1991, p.309). Even after a government change in Ankara Turkey’s consistent position was rewarded with a defense agreement. Greece manifested its insecurity by requesting territorial guarantees through similar defense agreements with the US³³. The Kissinger-Bitsios correspondence is one aspect of Greek efforts to strengthen its security position by third-party commitments.

In early August 1976 Turkey initiated a series of explorations between the islands of Lemnos and Mytilini. The research ship was escorted by a naval vessel and closely followed by Greek warships. This effectively challenged sovereign Greek rights in the Aegean Sea. Perceptions of an expansionist Turkish foreign policy were already

³³ When Turkey signed a defense agreement with the US in March 1976, Athens reciprocated, thus including in bilateral US-Greek relations the Turkish factor. The 7/10 ratio in aid emerged in those days.

stimulated in Athens after 1975 with the founding of the Turkish Fourth Army, or as it is called, the “Aegean Army”³⁴. Also in March 1976 the Turkish Deputy Prime Minister on the record said: “...all the Aegean islands off the Turkish mainland, including the Dodecanese islands must belong to Turkey.” The Greek opposition in Parliament requested the sinking of the ship conducting the oceanologic surveys³⁵. Greece requested a meeting of the UN Security Council and appealed to the International Court of Justice for an interim judgment. Recommendations by the Security Council attempted to satisfy both parties’ concerns and was drafted by NATO allies (Stearns, 1992). The International Court rejected Greece’s request for interim measures; however it continued to consider Greece’s submission for the substance of the delimitation of the continental shelf. Response from both international bodies was not considered satisfactory in Greece, but it helped to diffuse the immediate crisis (Stearns, 1992).

After the crisis was passed and negotiations were conducted in Berne in November 1976, both sides undertook to refrain from actions that might impede a resolution of bilateral differences through peaceful means. Greek concessions were deemed necessary as negotiations between Greece and the EEC could be jeopardized by the protraction of a crisis in the Aegean (Woodhouse, 1991, p.310). The pattern of continuous resort to non-conclusive negotiations after the escalation of tension over diverse issues led many to view Greek-Turkish disputes as a parochial theme (Sazanides, 1979, p.84).

³⁴ A force not assigned to NATO, and including Turkey’s entire parachute force, all the Turkish marine units, an airborne division with helicopters, other select units and a fleet of landing crafts. (Constas, 1991)

³⁵ Governmental constraint to pursue military action was heavily criticized

The 1987 Greek-Turkish crisis should be examined not only in its most acute phase of imminent hostilities during the last days of March 1987, but rather as a comprehensive example of Greek-Turkish relations. Domestic realities in both countries and international pressures at many levels contributed both to the expansion and to the retraction of conflict. Within the context of diplomatic initiatives preceding the crisis and the “Davos process” of non-war resulting from it, one identifies most of the recurrent issues in our subject matter. Still, an important question has not been answered, even if speculations abound. Why was Greece dragged to the negotiating table and produced a “deplorable” paper, in the words of the person who signed it, despite the advantageous diplomatic and military position it held at the height of the crisis³⁶?

After coming to power in 1981, Papandreou pursued a pragmatic foreign policy despite more inflexible ideological positions he had advised during his opposition years³⁷. Turkish writers view his foreign policy as a strong departure from earlier Greek positions (Constas, 1991, p.29). He conducted a personalized foreign policy with the bureaucratic establishment many times kept in the dark about the tactics of the moment. The preparation of the Davos meeting after the 1987 crisis was a dark highlight of his personal diplomacy. Regarding Greek-Turkish relations, Papandreou connected any future Greek-Turkish dialogue with a prerequisite respect for Greek sovereign rights and

³⁶ Kapsis, 1990, p.137. The book by Kapsis on the 1987 crisis is a detailed account of the events as he -- then Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs-- experienced them. It remains uncontested in many of his provocative statements

³⁷ Constas, 1991, p.46. Also there, a summary of Greek foreign policy objectives during that period

the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northern Cyprus. Papandreou based his policies on the underlying assumption of a Turkish threat to Hellenism and not just Greece (Constas, 1991, p.46). His basic point was that “negotiations with Turkey were pointless because there was nothing to negotiate.” (Constas, 1991, p.18) It is interesting to contrast this statement he made in early March 1987 with his subsequent acquiescence to a dialogue after the crisis³⁸.

Turkish Prime Minister Ozal, after his coming to power in 1983, considered Greek-Turkish relations to hold top priority (Constas, 1991, p.29). He announced a token withdrawal of Turkish troops from Northern Cyprus and lifted visa requirements for Greek visitors (March 31, 1994), among other measures, in an effort to create an atmosphere of trust (Constas, 1991, p.30). Greece objected to any commitment, judging such proposals as opportunistic (due to concurrent talks for the release of the EC-Turkey Association Agreement) and insincere, as they were in direct contrast to Turkish diplomatic initiatives (Turkey recognized the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus on 15 November, 1983) and military activities (421 Turkish violations of Greek national airspace during 1984.)³⁹ Attempts for reconciliation made earlier (the 1982 moratorium and an attempt to arrange an unofficial meeting --ironically in Davos-- in 1986) had failed after a series of incidents, the most serious involving the death of three soldiers at the Greek-Turkish border. Western reaction to an apparent Greek “intransigence” became increasingly pronounced. As a Turkish analyst writes, “western reaction became

³⁸ Cofoudakis in Constas, p.47, and f.15, p.55 “A dialogue meant give and take, and in our case is only to give. We do not have any claims, and therefore there can be nothing positive for Greece from such a dialogue.”

³⁹ Action was condemned by Resolutions 554 and 550 of the UNSC

more and more partial towards Ozal. It seemed as if Greece was to pay the price if two important members of the Western Alliance's south flank were not to talk." (Constas, 1991, p.31)

The continental shelf became the immediate cause of yet another crisis between Greece and Turkey in late March 1987. Greece tabled a bill in March 6 to take control of the Canadian owned North Aegean Petroleum Company. NAPC had made earlier plans to conduct oil drillings in an area beyond Greek territorial waters and made a provocative announcement on 24 February, 1987 about its intent to execute such drillings after March 28 (Kapsis, 1990, p.49). The Canadian company suspected that Greece wanted a better share of the prospective oil deposits and clearly objected to the bill. Turkey concurred in its estimation with the Canadian company. The Wall Street Journal of March 4 published an article on the possibility of a Greek-Turkish crisis. Turkey tried to get a statement from the Greek government to the effect that Greece would refrain from drilling outside its territorial sea.

The Greek government was in a dilemma because any such statement would provide a renewed basis to the Berne Protocol of 1976, limiting what Greece views as sovereign rights in the Aegean Sea. The Berne Protocol limited any provocative unilateral actions in the Aegean *for the duration of a negotiation* about the continental shelf. An interesting point is that the license to the Canadian firm was due to expire on April 1, 1987, and it led to speculation of the consortium's involvement in the making of the crisis. It is revealing for the case to note that technically there was no possibility for any oil exploration until six months after March due to equipment maintenance.

The proposed bill was met with an announcement for a Turkish deployment of its own research vessel under naval escort, after accusing Greece of breaching the Berne protocol. As Birand notes, the Turkish military had to choose between an all-out war in order to stop any Greek exploration or a similar undertaking. The announcement followed a Turkish diplomatic note to the Secretary General of the UN on March 25. Prime Minister Ozal was at the time in London, recuperating from heart surgery he had had some days earlier in Houston, Texas. A series of announcements made by the Turkish government detailed the projected vessel's course, drawing it within twelve nautical miles from the Greek coast. The Greek government stated it would confront the ship and put military units on alert status.

Papandreou held NATO and the US to be responsible for the crisis. Kapsis describes Papandreou telling the Ministerial Council of March 27 that at the time before the crisis US Undersecretary of Defense Richard Pearl was still in Ankara (he left on March 26 after a 6-day visit in the company of Secretary of Defense Kaspar Weinberger), even though he had resigned on 25 March⁴⁰. Papandreou subsequently ordered the suspension of all communication activities at the US base in Nea Makri, and dispatched his Foreign Minister to Sofia. In another carefully planned move, he briefed the Warsaw Pact ambassadors prior to their NATO counterparts. European countries took a clear stand in favor of Greek positions. The US stuck to its traditional policy of equal distances. Lord Carrington, then NATO's Secretary General, assumed the role of

⁴⁰ Kapsis states that there is no known connection between the Turkish planning and Pearl, however he refers to a statement made by Pearl at the time of his departure; "I hope that Greece will not act foolishly... Ozal has good intentions but Papandreou adopts hard line positions." (translation from Greek text)

mediator --after being briefed on the situation by his government-- and got a statement from Ozal that "Turkey would not proceed with the exploration if Greece did not proceed with its own."⁴¹ The crisis was over. It was the first crisis ended by NATO's involvement, even if indirectly.

Also important in the 1987 crisis from our perspective are the post-crisis agreements and the subsequent failure of the Davos process. Why did both countries resort to negotiations? Pridham refers to a strong personal element present in the way foreign policy was conducted by both Papandreou and Ozal (Constas, 1991, pp.80-85). Further motives could be found in the shock apparent in statements by both leaders after the realization of the strong possibility for hostilities. The crisis had a sobering effect. Both countries wanted to spare resources for the restructuring of their economies. Greece in 1985 had commenced an austerity program and Turkey had in sight an Association Agreement with the EC. The Turkish desire to conclude the Association Agreement was made apparent by the April 14 application for membership. Plausible reason for Ozal could have been the domestic process of democratic consolidation he initiated against a dominant military bureaucracy (Constas, 1991, pp.48-54). From the Turkish viewpoint the Davos process focused on a definition of Greek-Turkish differences with the goal of concluding a bilateral comprehensive arrangement which would as a minimum refer to Bern. It also meant that Cyprus would be set aside until trust could be built in the Aegean. The vehicle for a deeper, social rapprochement was perceived to be a growth in economic exchanges.

⁴¹ Later, Ozal in an interview confessed that he "wanted Carrington to keep his hands off the issue."

In Greece, Papandreou was heavily criticized for the Davos process. It is still not clear what “induced” or “pushed” him to the conduct of direct and unprepared talks. Foreign Service officials resigned and the opposition took the offensive for what it termed the abandonment of Cyprus. The Davos arrangements themselves included intensification of political and economic contacts, a hot line between Athens and Ankara, the promotion of a set of CSBMs as common measures. Greece lifted its objection to the 1964 EU-Turkey Association Agreement and Turkey lifted visa requirements for Greek nationals and rescinded a secret 1964 decree restricting the property rights of Greek nationals in Turkey⁴².

The Davos process failed to produce any lasting results. It lost momentum due to shifts in the domestic priorities of both governments. A series of provocative declarations and activities as well as the realization of the differences in positions during the negotiations held by the various political committees established by the Davos process further undermined that process. The bureaucracies representing the accumulated knowledge in the long history of Greek-Turkish relations failed to follow the “experiment” of the two premiers, an experiment they themselves soon came to reject later.

⁴² Decree 3801/1964. However, a similar secret decree, 3706/1970 remained active and became one of the many reasons that undermined the trust building attempted after 1987

II. BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REVIEW

A. GENERAL

Studies of Greek-Turkish relations by academics and practitioners have proliferated since 1974 after the invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces in response to a coup directed by the Greek military junta⁴³. Two broad areas of interest are relevant to our analysis of Greek-Turkish crises. Why does the conflict arise and how is it managed? The *focus of analysis of the conflict's causes* seems to be divided among the domestic perspective (political structures and decision making in each country, incompatible national interests, different strategic cultures, instability due to a long and incomplete process of democratic consolidation), the bilateral-regional perspective (role conflict, Mediterranean security, asymmetry in power, cross-issue linkages, diverse cultures, threat perceptions) and the international-mediation one (role of the US, NATO, and the UN, politics among the ECU-EU and between both countries)⁴⁴. The lines between perspectives become blurred partly because of bi-directional linkage politics from the domestic to the international realm (Constas, 1991, p.73).

⁴³ For a review of recent and not so recent titles on Greek-Turkish relations see "Vasikh vivliografia gia ta Ethnika themata," Athens 1996, Sideris Pub. A quantitative analysis linking works published, their focus and the status of Greek-Turkish relations could provide insight on the variance of parameters such as international interest, threat to regional peace and stability as well as a sign of geographical dispersion for academic concern with the issue

⁴⁴ The roles of Great Britain and Russia/Soviet Union have also been important, but are less relevant today

What are the causes of the conflict should be an established hypothesis before attempting to manage it, although misunderstanding the conflict's causes appears common among mediators. For the US in particular, Stearns --a former Ambassador to Greece-- argues that misunderstanding

...is the result of the inclination of policymakers to treat Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus as components of a strategic equation rather than as states with long histories and military and diplomatic priorities based on regional concerns that may or may not be compatible with the global strategy of the United States. Approaching them in this way has induced a kind of tone deafness in US policymaking and has led to serious miscalculations at critical moments. (Stearns, 1992, p.16)

The *prescriptive* part of the literature on Greek-Turkish conflict management seems divided over which contentious issue should be tackled first (Aegean, Cyprus or both), how issues should be treated (disjointed, package, framework) and over the preferred method for conflict management (bilateral, mediation or arbitration). It is interesting and worrying that optimism is absent for a near-term solution.

B. TURKISH DOMESTIC POLICIES

Veremis argues that Turkish domestic policies have historically been a synthesis of three trends; nationalism, Islam and westernization. The difficulty in integrating those trends is evident in Turkish society and creates contradictions that affect its foreign policy choices. While secularism and westernization were closely interrelated in Ataturk's vision, today westernization requires ideological pluralism and thus, paradoxically, allows for the presence of more traditional Islamic elements, which were

formerly outside the mainstream political process, in the political arena. Globalization of economies and communication has also led to fragmentation and the emergence of regional identities (Epetirida, 1996). If modernism was associated with the Turkish military in 1930, today the economic-liberal part of Turkish society carries the burden of progress, but finds itself excluded from the decision making process.

Overall, there is growing pressure from what was once the periphery of Turkish society. Devout and suspicious of the old elite establishment, which monopolized the center and tied the country to the west, these recently urbanized nouveaux riches have been claiming their due at the local, regional and national levels with increasing boldness.⁴⁵ (Kedourie, 1996, p.177)

Economic liberalism should not be considered incompatible with Islamic resurgence. Ozal's Turkey showed that the cohabitation of an ascending middle class with Islamic elements is possible. During his presidency the number of religious schools has grown immensely. Islamic resurgence in Turkey today acts as a catalyst for nationalism.

Moreover, the military has to resolve the contradiction in its roles of modernizing and intervening in Turkish politics (Kedourie, 1996). Ahmad comments that the possibility of another coup in Turkey is always present. His only qualification is that "it needs to be welcome" (Ahmad, 1993). A news report in December (12/23/96 by Turkish Daily News) quoted the leader of the Turkish Rebirth Party, Hasan Celan Guzel, saying, "the army is making preparations for a coup. A 72 percent increase in military salaries was approved out of fear of the coup." As a result of those intense socio-political problems Turkey has also been characterized in a report as "a nation susceptible to

⁴⁵ Bezanis in Transition (14 June 1996)

imminent internal collapse.”⁴⁶ The western community is at pains to ensure this collapse will not happen.

Turkey on its part has seen the West as a “goal” for its future. Approaching the West though, comes with a perceived cost for Turkey. “Turkey’s long standing military, political, economic and ideological-identificational engagement in the west made the military leaders vulnerable to western influence and enabled the west to adopt a policy of pressure which was felt and responded to in the democratic transition of Turkey following the last military intervention in 1980⁴⁷.” The statement’s validity, if true in 1950 or even in the early 1980s, should be re-examined today in view of provocative Turkish military proposals regarding “gray areas” in the Aegean, the conduct of negotiations with the US for continuing operations in Northern Iraq, and the resentful statements for a preemptive attack against Cyprus.

Greece has a particular interest in Turkish westernization and democratization. Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos forwards two reasons (Epetirida, 1996). Turkey’s elite effectively transposes a domestic perception of law on the international behavior of the country, exhibiting a revisionist character mediated only by power considerations. This flexible interpretation of law --the concept being used is “legality”-- becomes useful for an authoritative elite in domestic as well as in foreign policies. Legality is less deterministic than law and gains credibility from the relative power of the “advocate.” In the words of Turkish Foreign Minister Baykal: “The basic principle that guides

⁴⁶ CSCE Digest April 1996 p.8. Also see: Stavrou, 1996

⁴⁷ Bezanis in Transition (14 June 1996)

Turkish foreign policy is *peace at home, peace in the world*, however, peace should not have priority over justice.” The “rule of law” within Turkey receives regular condemnation from groups such as the Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International or bodies such as the European Parliament. Its international application has been the concern of Greece as well as of other countries contiguous to Turkey.

The second reason --as stated by Pangalos-- is the lack of transparent democratic control within Turkey.

In the case of defense policy both Portugal and Turkey have succeeded... in maintaining elite consensus and thus may reflect the still important influence the military holds in the decision making process. In Turkey it remains the case that the public is largely insulated from whatever debate on security policy takes place. (Chipman, 1988, p.357)

Freedom in decision making could induce an opportunistic leadership to pursue revisionist policies without serious concern for public discomfort. As an example, Pangalos compares the varying degree of public debate for defense spending in the two countries⁴⁸. It is ironic, perhaps, that Pangalos himself has been an outright critic of enormous defense spending. Compared with Turkey, Greece has to face a dilemma common to democracies. Security comes at a cost which needs to be continuously reviewed in an open society not conditioned a priori to accept the associated premium. In the Greek-Turkish case a détente based on a reversal of perceptions (culture) without a change in underlying realities (competition) is potentially dangerous for Greece since a public opinion would be less and less inclined to accept security costs that are in fact

⁴⁸ Greece in 1994 spend almost 4,000M\$ (1990 dollars). Turkey had military expenditures of more than 6,100M\$

necessary yet are viewed as overstated. For recent defense expenditures see Table 1. The arms race between the countries is de-stabilizing for the region as a whole. Alliance partners have facilitated this buildup since the end of the Cold War through cascading conventional arms.

Defense as % of GDP	1970-1974	1975-1979	1980-1984	1985-1989	1994
Greece	4.7	6.7	6.6	6.2	5.6
Turkey	3.4	4.4	4.0	3.3	4.1
NATO	-	-	4.6	4.7	3.3
Per capita expenditures Gr./Tu (\$ 1985)					204Gr/65Tu

Table 1. Defense expenditures of Greece, Turkey and NATO average as percentage of GDP. From: NATO Handbook, Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995

A European Turkey might ameliorate some of its mounting social and economic problems⁴⁹. A poor neighbor is a concern for “post-Cold War threats” and there are indeed continuous incidents in the Aegean involving activities ranging from drug trafficking to illegal immigration. “It is becoming apparent that only the resolution of fundamental domestic problems, which are metaphysical in essence but real in terms of the violence and social polarization they engender, can break down neighboring countries’ mistrust.”⁵⁰ The Economist in a survey of Turkey gives the following table

⁴⁹ Social problems are resulting from a rapid urbanization, a young population, and an unstable economy with large unemployment figures. One of the reasons for the ascendancy to power of the Refah Party (Welfare Party) of Islamists is its promise of an alternative way. *The Economist*, June 8 1996.

⁵⁰ Bezanis, in Transition 14 June 1996

(Table 2) as indicative of the standard of living of the two countries. To deflect attention from economic burdens Turkey has pursued characteristically nationalistic policies “such as promulgating bizarre territorial claims against Greece and reacting with callous indifference to killings by Turkish troops in Cyprus.” (The Economist, Survey, June 1996)

1993/1994	Private consumption per person	Cars per 1000 people	Telephone lines per 1000 people	TV sets per 1000 people	Infant mortality per 1000 live births
Greece	6,367 \$	188	478	212	8.5
Turkey	3,617 \$	43	201	269	52.6

Table 2. Standard of living for Greece and Turkey. From The Economist, 8 June, 1996, p17

However, Greece’s reluctance to allow the flow of European aid and funds towards Turkey without any attached political guarantees and promises by Turkey serves well Turkish preconceptions of a hostile Greek factor in Europe. Nonetheless in 1995 Greece acquiesced in the Customs Union between Turkey and the EU. In the aftermath of that development Greece experienced a qualitative upgrading in Turkish demands for a revision of the Aegean status which culminated in the Imia crisis of early 1996. Eralp stresses the preoccupation of the “governing elite of the Turkish republic” with the issues of Westernization and the “Greek factor” in Turkish efforts to approach Europe.

The presence of a strong state tradition in Turkey has been the subject of a creative exercise of Turkish art students in 1986. The students dressed in Second World

War German SS uniforms and directed the public in half-German, half-Turkish “kimlik bitte,” “your papers please.” People responded without questioning authority. The state-centric tradition has flowed from what the Turkish intellectual Gokalp has described between the wars as “in that state we need one nation.” (Liakos, To Vima, 10 November, 1996,) Chidioglou comments: “Where most states have instituted an army, in Turkey the army created the state.” (Hidioglou, 1995) This tradition has led many analysts to comment on the continuity of Turkish foreign policy, since the armed forces constitute the power nexus of decision making. Others notice a continuum of repressive practices against diverse elements within Turkish boundaries such as the Kurds or the Armenians and the Greeks.

A review of the development of Turkish security policies since the creation of the Turkish republic by Sezer reinforces one more theme. Turkish foreign policy has been marked by a prominence of strategic utility rather than any ideological bias⁵¹. The Turkish ambassador to Iran in a recent interview is quoted as saying “Of course Turkey is a US ally in NATO and a friend of the US. However, this friendship is no reason for Ankara to be completely affiliated with Washington on all issues.”⁵²

Kramer suggests two explicit priorities for Turkish foreign policy. First, it should not negatively interfere with economic and societal development but it should mainly serve the preservation of national integrity, the legal basis of the Turkish environment, and the Turkish people. The problem however lies not with the “definition” of the

⁵¹ Sezer in Adelphi Papers no.164

⁵² Ahmet Mithat Balkan, interview reported on 27 May 1995 in Turkish Daily News

foreign policy but with its application. A maximalist approach to territorial integrity, a selective inclusion of treaties and obligations in the “legal basis,” and the irredentism inherent in the “protection of Turkish elements” present a completely different picture. Poulton on Turkey’s exploitation of its people for military purposes writes: “It is likely that military circles in Turkey also viewed the Turkish minorities especially in Southern Bulgaria and Western Greece as potential military buffers.⁵³” Stavrou writes on Turkish objectives in the Balkans: “One can explain the infusion of Turkish troops into Bosnia as a second step to undo the treaty of Berlin[1881]. The first one was taken in Cyprus.⁵⁴”

Perhaps one could not find more indicative maximalist statements worthy of an imperial and missionary conscience than those made by President Demirel. On Bosnia: “How can Turkey that also came out of the hide of the Ottoman empire remain indifferent in the face of problems even if there is distance and no shared borders.” On the Middle East:

Turkey has governed the Middle East in peace from 1517 to 1917. It cannot remain indifferent to what is happening in the region today. Neither can it remain indifferent to what is happening in Iraq which it administered for 500 years.

On the Aegean:

Take the matter of the Aegean islands. These islands were under the Ottoman rule for centuries.... Turkey has to do everything through dialogue, especially in today’s environment. If the other side does not want dialogue, it has to explain this to the world public opinion. What I say should not be misunderstood. If Turkey has no option but to use force, it will do so and it will not be blamed for it.

⁵³ Transition, 14 June 1996

⁵⁴ Stavrou: *The dismantling of the Balkan security system. Consequences for Greece, Europe and NATO.* Mediterranean Quarterly Vol.6 Number 1, Winter 1996

On Cyprus: “Cyprus is a national issue for Turkey.” On Turkey’s role: “The country has a globally important role to perform.”⁵⁵

A form of cultural and academic “imperial” revisionism has also appeared in Turkey in the tradition of the Turkish theories of the sun. It is important in our a-historic times for one to take into consideration the potential use of such theories in foreign policy⁵⁶.

Fuller characterizes Turkish foreign policy as preserving Turkish territorial integrity, establishing friendly relationships with the great powers and having a continuity in prudence (with the exception of the Cyprus invasion). He suggests a new outlook on Turkish foreign policy based on a glorious Ottoman past. “The re-examination and re-evaluation of Ottoman history, suggests that the Turks may come to see themselves again at the center of a world reemerging around them on all sides rather than at the tail end of a European world which is increasingly uncertain, whether or not it sees Turkey as a part of itself.”⁵⁷ Greek analysts seem to agree on the revisionist character of Turkish foreign policy although they comment admiringly on its quality and continuity (Hidiroglou, 1995).

After the coming to power of the Islamic Welfare party many have observed a re-nationalization of Turkish foreign policy. It is expressed by anti-American, anti-western and anti-Israeli declarations. Examples are the official visits in 1996 to Libya and Iran

⁵⁵ The above statements were all made during an interview to the Turkish Daily News in March 1996

⁵⁶ For a full analysis see: Vryonis Spyros: *The Turkish State and History. Clio meets the Grey Wolf*.

⁵⁷ Fuller, RAND paper R-4232, 1996. Also Stavrou, 1996

made by the Turkish Prime Minister Erbakan. Thomas Friedman in the New York Times (July 17, 1996) explains Turkish re-nationalization in socio-cultural terms as a backlash against globalization. Others see it as a direct product of stagnant Turkish-EU relations and condemnations of Turkey's human rights violations, or a series of differences with the US over operations in Iraq. Caspian oil and Turkish proposals for a revision of the Montreux treaty (Straits status) have been contentious issues with Russia. Security concerns dictate a continuous discussion between Turkey and the US. The remedy proposed seems always to be a strong support for Turkey on all issues involving Turkey and third parties out of concern for losing a strategically important ally.

C. GREEK DOMESTIC POLITICS

Analyses of the significance of Greek domestic policies on the Greek-Turkish conflict focus on three issues: the strong perceptions shared across the political spectrum against Turkey, the lack of coordination in Greek-Cypriot foreign policy objectives mostly before 1974, and the post-1974 disenchantment with NATO and the US. After 1989 there is a growth in published works on strategic studies and they have greatly influenced the course of subsequent policy formulation⁵⁸.

Disenchantment with the West becomes more salient if one takes under consideration the security guarantees Greece has always attached to participation in NATO, and the extraordinary degree of influence the US exercised on Greece at least

⁵⁸ For a discussion of the state of the field in Greece see: Epetirida, 1996

until 1974. “The humiliation of the 1974 Cyprus crisis demonstrated to Greek-policy makers that the defense posture designed by Greece’s allies at best was not compatible with and at worst was contrary to the national interest.” (Constas, 1991, p.98)

Differences with the US become important after 1974, which marks a Europeanization of Greek politics.

Greece had been associated with Europe since 1961 but the process of integration froze due to the seven-year military junta in 1967. Political motives and the requirement of a strategic advantage against Turkey drove Greece closer to the European Community (Valinakis, 1989, p.242). At many times, especially in the period 1981-1989, diplomatic and other resources had to be appropriated between Washington and Brussels. The presence of charismatic even if contradictory figures such as Makarios, Karamanlis and Papandreou on the domestic scene has also drawn some analysis on the linkage between personality variables and foreign policy formulation. The Davos “non-war” initiative of 1987-1988 has been viewed as an exercise in foreign relations at the personal level (Papandreou-Ozal) instead of a systematic effort to minimize differences (Constas, 1991, p.59). The Davos process culminated in intense domestic criticism of Papandreou’s decisions. The most articulate criticism came from resigned Foreign Ministry officials and the opposition for the alleged abandonment of principles established in Greek foreign policy and the potentially disastrous ramifications of such ill-prepared initiatives for the future. De-linking progress in Cyprus with bilateral negotiations and a self-imposed restraint by Greece on the continental shelf explorations were amongst the debated issues (Constas, 1991, p.52).

Constas suggests that international constraints after 1974 more than anything else formed "...a broad consensus on foreign policy transcending party lines and ideologies." (Vryonis, 1991) Chipman finds this more pronounced on issues regarding Greek-Turkish relations. The consensus was based on the principles of an independent and multi-dimensional foreign policy, the recognition of an eastern threat vice a northern one, and the recognition of a certain divergence in interests between western attitudes and Greece regarding the Aegean and Cyprus. Before 1974, Couloumbis notes, Greece "was confronted by a long chain of political, economic and social crises, and consensus in key aspects of foreign and domestic policy has been the exception rather than the rule." (Vryonis, 1991) Greek political infighting and a competition for primacy in decision making between Athens and Nicosia resulted in the 1974 invasion of Cyprus by Turkey, in what Turks called "peace operations" and Greeks called "Atilla."

A broad accord on foreign policy and domestic legitimacy allows post-1974 Greek governments to adopt intransigent positions or rhetoric on security issues, feeling immune from external intervention in the sense of external manipulation of the domestic political arena⁵⁹. Loulis, however, observes two different elements during the same period: a strong ideological bias on foreign policy and a personification of alternative foreign policy positions, resulting in political polarization within Greece and inflammatory rhetoric. He forwards the view that a "second level systemic change" is necessary for the Greek political system to function effectively and that the only source

⁵⁹ Larrabee, 1996. External intervention is a major theme in Greek political thought. It is interesting to note for the historical record that the first parties founded in Greece at the creation of the Modern Greek State were named after the Guarantor Powers, Britain, France and Russia

of such a change is external to the system. It is not immediately apparent from which direction such a change should come. The effectiveness of Greek foreign policy has been much debated in the aftermath of the Bosnia crisis and the failed symbolic FYROM embargo. Larrabee describes Greek foreign policy as “Greece played a good hand badly,” and depicts both the situational advantages of Greece in the Balkan world as well as its problematic foreign policy. Cofoudakis sees the Bosnia crisis as an opportunity for a review of Greek foreign policy. “Even though Greece, her European allies, and the United States shared the concern about the risks of regional instability, they disagreed on how to address them, and how they affected Greek national interests.⁶⁰” Criticizing Greek planning he goes on: “With the end of the cold war Greece seemed unprepared for the depth of change.⁶¹” Despite this criticism, today the Greek contribution is seen as a stabilizing factor in the area⁶². The major challenge is coordinating individual foreign policies with the outcome of the still on-going processes of European integration and institutional change.

A major current debate in Greek foreign policy revolves around the suitability or even the viability for a Greek-Cypriot “unified defense doctrine.” It divides the foreign policy and defense establishments along the lines of “soft-liners” who would prefer a more multilateral and negotiated approach to Greek-Turkish relations, mostly through the European Union, and “hard liners” who see multilateralism as a futile exercise based on past experience. Their hopes are a credible immediate as well as extended deterrent. It

⁶⁰ Cofoudakis: *Greek Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Era. Issues and Challenges*. Mediterranean Quarterly Vo.7 No3, Summer 1996

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Cofoudakis, Larrabee, Stavrou, and others

is important here, to note the quality of their disagreement, which is one of means and not of ends. The doctrine itself promotes the view of a functional unity in defense efforts within areas of interest for both Greece and Cyprus. It focuses on the international status of the Cypriot State, its ability to conduct an independent foreign policy and the existence of a Turkish threat to both Greece and Cyprus. Platias identifies four areas of relevance⁶³. Politically, Greece stops ignoring 1/10 of the Greek population. Strategically it minimizes the “window of vulnerability” by revoking the hostage status of Cyprus to Turkish aggression. Militarily it increases costs associated with Turkish options, and at the diplomatic level, it creates conditions for the withdrawal of Turkish troops from Cyprus. It also enhances the Greek presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, an important area for Greek strategic, political and business interests.

Critics examine the feasibility of implementing the doctrine. They state possible Turkish reactions since the doctrine itself would be threatening to explicitly stated Turkish vital interests.⁶⁴ With the doctrine, they claim, the essence of Greek-Turkish conflict is automatically transferred to the Green Line therefore, legalizing partition. Here it must be noted that at least in declaratory terms the linkage between the Greek-Turkish conflict and Cyprus has been done long before the “doctrine,” at the latest since 1985. The doctrine is more of an expansion of that reality than its cause. Opponents to the doctrine claim that it would become an obstacle in finding a solution for Cyprus through its accession to EU. The US has also objected to the doctrine’s implementation,

⁶³ Platias in *Ta Nea*

⁶⁴ Zepos in *Epetirida* 1996

at least through statements made by the State Department's spokesman. The question that arises has not only practical but also political and legal dimensions. The right of self-defense against a country, unlawfully occupying roughly 40% of your territory is compromised in the name of practicality and convenience.

D. BILATERAL CONTEXT

Many are attributing the essence of the Greek-Turkish conflict primarily to a perception of animosity⁶⁵, and all include perceptions as causal factors. During a RAND conference on Mediterranean security held in 1995, the Greek-Turkish dispute was one of the four security challenges for the Mediterranean⁶⁶. Bacheli presents the French-German example as a simile for Greek-Turkish relations. Stearns accepts the validity of the simile, however, he rightly disqualifies its overgeneralization. France and Germany have maintained cultural exchanges for the last 200 years, at least at the elite level. Moreover, France has not been under German domination for 400 years. Liakos comments on the different processes followed by the two nations for state making. Turkey tried to homogenize and therefore became an introvert state, at least until the 1950s. Greece, on the other hand, attempted to integrate Greeks from the outside world and achieve stability through extensive diplomacy and alliances, thus gravitating to a more cosmopolitan outlook. The eventual growth and maturity of Turkey compelled it to

⁶⁵ Bacheli, Clogg, Miller (interview), Gurel, among others

⁶⁶ The others were: Maghreb, the Balkans and the Arab-Israeli conflict.

seek a role for Turks beyond its borders, a thought that troubles Greek minds. Stearns, in that tradition, views as the most salient characteristic of Greek-Turkish relations a struggle over territory, although it has taken many forms over the years.

In the regional-bilateral context of Greek-Turkish relations, the Turkish geopolitical prominence is of paramount importance. Misha Glenny talks about re-emerging axes in the Balkans in the tradition of Huntington. Potential conflict spillover threatens lines of trade and communication to the Middle East⁶⁷. The way one views the Mediterranean pre-determines one's options for conflict management in the area. The Mediterranean could be conceptualized as an integral part of Europe, "the place where the Persian Gulf begins," or as a region in transition⁶⁸. Future European security arrangements, their coordination with NATO, and socio-political changes in the Mediterranean all will have an effect on Greek-Turkish relations. One can not deny the impact of a Greek-Turkish conflict on the above issues as well.

Analysts view Turkey as a pivotal state. Characteristically, Bacheli, Lesser and Fuller in separate analyses present Turkey as a regional power. Larrabee too, writes: "Turkey has also emerged as a more important actor on the Balkan scene," while Kaplan sees a broader Near East policy emerging (Stavrou, 1996). Recent Turkish-Israeli military agreements have encouraged similar projections. Thomas Freedman has called it "quite simply, a major strategic realignment in Middle East." (Stavrou, 1996) The presented option remaining for Greece is whether "it will work with or against it."

⁶⁷ Foreign Affairs, Spring 1995

⁶⁸ Mediterranean Security: New Issues and Challenges, Santa Monica: RAND 1996

In Greece, such dilemmas are considered yet another indication of the revisionist character of a neo-Ottoman State (Epetirida, 1996). Greek strategic doctrine, explicitly since 1985 but in reality even before 1974, has focused on a threat from the East, which Platias characterizes as extensive and intensive (Constas, 1991, p.92). In assessing the Turkish threat, Greek writers focus on statements by leading Turkish politicians, diplomatic initiatives, and military posture. Bacheli recognizes three valid concerns for Greek policy makers: the presence of the Turkish Aegean Army in the Western Turkish coast, signs of a Turkish expansionist policy and the lessons drawn from 1974. In attempting to balance the threat, Greece has attempted to develop an autonomous security policy and a deterrent force capability. In a letter addressed to his counterpart, the Greek Foreign Minister outlined Greek positions on bilateral issues⁶⁹. Turkey, on the other hand, posits as Greece-related security concerns the potential transformation of the Aegean into a Greek lake, the Greek opposition to a European Turkey, the activity of the Greek American lobby within the US and Greek support for terrorist activities by the PKK⁷⁰. Threats are clearly not symmetrical for the two countries, Greece being the more threatened state.

A continuity surfaces in Greek-Turkish relations from an apparent realization of the high costs of open hostilities. Usually after crises we observe a period of withdrawal

⁶⁹ To Vima, 8 December 1996. Among others, we find 1) Greece is for a European orientation of Turkey and for its approach to European institutions. 2) Greece demands from Turkey to accept international law as the basis of its relations with Europe in general and Greece in particular. 3) Human rights violations in Turkey remain a concern

⁷⁰ Greece has never accepted the last and has consistently maintained that expansion of its territorial waters to 12 nautical miles does not transform the Aegean to a Greek sea given the rights of transit passage provided for in the UNCLOS

as the realization of conflict cools tempers. Coufoudakis writes for continuous cycles of confrontation-negotiation-confrontation. Rarely do crises lead to open confrontations (the main exception being Cyprus). Kramer recognizes that reconciliation has more advantages for both countries⁷¹. An interesting case is the observance by Greece of the 1976 Berne Protocol that *de facto* limits its activities in the “continental shelf,” as the 1987 crisis has proved. Moreover, that comes despite the 1985 retraction of the Protocol by the Greek government. Today however it is “doubtful whether the Greek-Turkish conflict could be settled under crisis conditions.” (Stearns, 1992, p.12)

A second observed coherence in Greek-Turkish relations is the lack of a continuous political commitment to resolve problems. Lack of political understanding between the two countries is seen as a hindrance to the success of any technical agreements such as confidence and security building measures. In fact, arms control measures cannot be a substitute for political agreements, as Larrabee observes (Larrabee, 1996). Political agreements were easier when a common enemy was present for both countries. The two most pronounced periods of Greek-Turkish détente were made possible in the 1930 by the Italian specter and in the early 1950s by the Russian threat. The Davos period has been also the result of external pressure. “And even then, the basic policy held by the two countries remained stubbornly the same; the methods employed to solve the crisis were usually palliative.” (Constas, 1991) Gurel also suggests that “Turkey and Greece could only develop their relations in harmony when and only when

⁷¹ A response to the question “How do you visualize Greek-Turkish friendship?” comes to mind, given by a Greek sociologist at Panteion University in Athens: “It is like God. I believe in it, but I doubt if I will ever see it.”

they mutually perceived a threat and were at the same time encouraged by an extra regional power dominant in the region to cooperate against the threat.” Stearns proposes two other stimuli for re-drafting Turkish foreign policy towards Greece: the economic burden to Turkey of continuing an anti-Greek campaign, as well as the “status” cost relating to Turkey’s defiance of UN resolutions in Cyprus. Even if Turkey has showed a remarkable inflexibility in adapting its foreign policy to such inputs as international law, it is probable that the possibility of a European future could impose some constraints.

Cyprus has been since 1954 the crux of Greek-Turkish competition. As Sezer observes “In fact the Cyprus conflict has never had an independent life of its own.” (Sezer, p.54) In Cyprus, one can still view the only “wall” left standing after Berlin. However, in Cyprus people on both sides do not consider the Green Line as arbitrary. There does not exist a minimum of concurrence in interests. A large number of settlers has entered the northern part, which has altered the population balances of the status quo ante. Moreover, in a stark similarity with Bosnia rather than with Germany, there is no unifying Cypriot nationalism. Greek and Turkish officials make strong efforts to reiterate any operational issue linkages with official visits to the island and declarations of support or intervention as deemed necessary.

In broad terms, Greek-Turkish relations are an example of the dilemmas present in asymmetric relations between states as the prevalent international regime fluctuates. Turkey, being the stronger state, desires a political solution as it reliably reflects power realities. As Baykal (as foreign minister) has suggested: “We are of the opinion that the problems between Turkey and Greece should be resolved through a meaningful,

comprehensive and result oriented dialogue.” Greece in contrast insists on international law to support its thesis. “By promoting negotiations over judicial solutions to issues such as the continental shelf, Turkey gave preference to a political solution over which it could utilize ‘might is right tactics’, rather than risk an unfavorable court decision due to her weak legal position.” In an address at Yale given during a 1996 official visit to the US by the Greek Prime Minister, Simitis explained why Greece does not view bilateral negotiations constructively. Negotiations are political, and Greece has negative experiences from the 1970 negotiations which saw many Turkish reversals. Greek governments also have the unwillingness and the constitutional inability to negotiate matters of sovereignty. Simitis also noticed a qualitative change in Turkish demands during 1996, as Turkey challenged the sovereignty of Greek islands for the first time.

E. US FOREIGN POLICY

The West has always been a reference point in Greek-Turkish relations. Both countries after the Second World War tried to integrate with the rest of their allies. For Greece, it was the only ideological choice after a destructive and unnecessary civil war. To Turkey, it was an aspiration for the elite and a source of foreign capital much needed for the modernization of the country. US policy became an important paragon to be considered in bilateral relations⁷².

⁷² One significant tool for American influence has been American foreign aid. For a brief history of its development see Arvanitopoulos: *The Politics of US Aid to Greece and Turkey*. Mediterranean Quarterly Vol.7, No.2 Spring 1996

Even in 1980 Ahmad suggests strong American influences on who is going to occupy the highest military position in Turkey.

The US regarded Greece and Turkey as third-pillar countries. Furthermore, US policy towards Greece and Turkey has not been regarded as the most successful. “US policy toward Greece, Turkey and Cyprus has in the past been so exclusively devoted to the containment of Soviet influence in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean that we have learned little about the countries that did the containing and have generally minimized or disregarded their own foreign policy concerns when they did not coincide with ours.⁷³” It is hard to forget an opening phrase by an American official that is all too common in bilateral exchanges with the US. “You have to understand US security interests and priorities in the area...” Subordination of political to military realities is a common theme. In general, Greece has been conceived as the weaker party and therefore a policy recommendation by Washington has always been for Athens to refrain from igniting conflict, especially when Turkey is a state with political instability. For the US the potential cost of Turkey’s oriental drift is greater than Greek sensitivities. When internationalization of disputes between Greece and Turkey was perceived as inimical to NATO or the western community, bilateral negotiations were proposed.

The US foreign policy towards Greece and Turkey has been characterized by Stearns, a former Ambassador to the area, as monolithic and he suggests some reasons that should provoke changes in the formulation of US policy⁷⁴. No problem between

⁷³ Stearns, 1992, p.3

⁷⁴ Ibid.

states is, according to Stearns, any more insignificant due to the inherent instability of the uni-polar or multi-polar system. The US has to resolve, in their addressing of Greek-Turkish relations, the competing demands of morality and practicality. If US policy was accepted for what it is, “that would not be a problem, however there is a confusion when there is an attempt to conceal this reality by Washington⁷⁵.” Development of a long-term policy is difficult in Washington since, as Stearns writes, “bureaucratic and political priorities conspire to discourage the development of a long term policy.” Stavrou considers American policy calculations in the Balkans as ahistorical.

The American dilemma has been, in the words of one official, “in order to keep Turkey happy we have become involved in a delicate balancing act in the Southern Balkans. If you appear to favor Turkey too much Greece becomes nervous, and so you have to find ways to calm Athens.”⁷⁶ US have always been concerned with domestic political developments in both countries since the end of the Second World War. Anti-American rhetoric drew negative attention to Greek foreign policy from the US during the Papandreou years in power. Now, the Welfare Party of Erbakan in Turkey has become the source of such criticism. More specifically, American officials are reported to refer to the “problem Turkey.” Their concern stems from a “domestic political instability in Turkey, its isolationism and a lack of credibility.” (*Eleftherotypia*, 7 January 1997) Political attitudes in Washington were not the same, though, towards Greece and Turkey. Turkey has been recognized as a proud country whereas Greece has been viewed

⁷⁵ Ibid., p.22 In the 1980 DECA between US and Turkey there is an American pledge to use its best efforts for obtaining military aid to Turkey while it expressed faith in the acceleration of disarmament efforts....

⁷⁶ Misha-Glenny, *Heading of War in the Southern Balkans*. *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1995

as a praetorian state (Couloumbis). Greece was not an integral part of Europe but a peripheral country. After 1989, Stavrou notes Greece's vital interests and position vis-à-vis the Balkans have not been taken seriously in the alliance or in Washington. Even if the Turkish Islamic government has strained relations with Washington, "the rationale is that Turkey is simply too valuable an ally to allow a matter like the sanctions law to get in the way." (Los Angeles Times, 11 September, 1996) Rouleau goes even further, suggesting that "[some European analysts predict] that Turkey will be one of the pillars of the Muslim empire of the United States."⁷⁷

One of the consequences of the Gulf war was the tilt of Turkish security policies towards the US instead of Europe. This became more important after the demise of the Soviet Union, which inspired a premature revisionism for Turkey's role in the area. It also coincided with an American desire to "minimize commitments to transatlantic partners." (Kuniholm, 1985, p.36) Despite its role in the Gulf crisis, Ankara did not gain a position in the expanding European Union. Some of the disillusionment with Europe resulted from the actions of a traditional ally, Germany, when the latter questioned the applicability of NATO operations in response to an Iraqi attack on Turkish soil.

F. ROLE OF NATO

Chipman in 1988 characterized relations among NATO and the countries in the Southern region as "politics of emancipation," after focusing on the nationalization of

⁷⁷ Rouleau: Turkey Beyond Atatürk, Foreign Affairs

policies, the different substance of Mediterranean strategic dilemmas and on a quid pro quo nature of settling affairs. He claims that it is easy to observe

...the mental tradeoffs that can be made between the fact of NATO membership and the strength of relations with each other of the NATO allies. When they [relations] are bad, much of the *raison d'être* of NATO membership --closer affiliation to the west-- seems to be less relevant.

The rationale for drafting security policies in the Southern region "...is not exclusively focused on NATO requirements or on NATO threat perceptions." (Chipman, 1988, p.336)

In Greek-Turkish relations too, one observes the political character of the Alliance. Each of the two countries "...tries to use the organization to its advantage in its disputes with the other; each weakens NATO in the process." (Haass, 1988, p.61) As Meinardus writes: "It is interesting that the Turkish policy of vetoing Greece's re-entry to NATO in the 1970s and making it dependent on concessions in bilateral issues is reminiscent of Greece's present policy of vetoing Turkey's entry into the European Community, at least as long as Ankara fails to call back its soldiers from Cyprus." (Constas, 1991, p.159) The alliance, too, avoids anything but political statements in commenting the Greek-Turkish situation. For example, the island of Lemnos in Northern Aegean continues to be excluded from NATO funding and planning due to its contested status as a demilitarized island by Turkey, but is sufficiently armed nationally by Greece. Generally in the Southern region, a region that has not received the security prominence of the central front for a number of years, if ever, "...political concerns have taken precedence over military factors." (Pedlow, 1992) The "Rogers

agreement” for Greece’s return to the military structure was the high point of such politicking. A corollary of the Rogers agreement politics was the (perhaps necessary) vagueness in command arrangements in the Aegean. Delays in implementing the command structure after 1992 have nowhere been more notable than in the southeastern region. The moral is that the cost will be paid eventually in some form or another.

The political realities observed by the alliance have exasperated the Greek side in what it perceives as a clear tilt towards Turkey. As Prime Minister Karamanlis said in the Greek Parliament after 1974,

Greece did not depart from the military command of NATO because it is against the alliance. To the contrary. Under certain conditions we are for the alliance.... Greece left in order to protest against the Turkish invasion in Cyprus. (Constas, 1991, p.158)

Later, Greek demands for border security guarantees early in the 1980s were shelved by the Alliance as no one was prepared to grant them. Such guarantees look today more and more relevant on the eve of expansion. As Papacosma observes, “When NATO allies initially called for the two disputants to negotiate their bilateral problems they unwittingly (in most cases) supported Ankara’s tactic of more than two decades that seeks a political rather than legal solution for Greek-Turkish differences.”(

Mediterranean Quarterly, Vol.7 No.4, Fall 1996)

Many in NATO view the Greek-Turkish conflict and its inability to manage it as models of similar potential situations after the Eastern expansion. “It is important to get both the East and the South right.” (Larrabee, 1996) “If differences between Paris and Washington and between Greece and Turkey are not constrained they could threaten

NATO's structural reforms, its plans for a European defense identity and enlargement.”
(Reuters, 20 November 1996) The US supports its role in the Mediterranean by suggesting its unique ability to contain Greek-Turkish conflict. The question of containment has been answered effectively so far. What remains is the realization that it needs to be managed.

G. EU

Greek accession to the European community has altered fundamentally the Greek-Turkish balance achieved under the association relationship in the 1960s. Prime Minister Simitis, a Europeanist has explicitly stated in 1996 that Europe is a cornerstone of Greek national strategy. European links have served two purposes for Greece: realistic as well as psychological. The European Community was the only acceptable political hope for stability in the immediate post-1974 era. Disenchanted with NATO and the US, Greece had to meet its security guarantees by upgrading its economic and political capital. By investing in the creation of a dynamic and adaptable society Greece attempted to overcome years of stagnation and political turmoil with a challenge. The degree of success has yet to be proven as Europe itself is changing. That is not to say that Greek-European relations are without problems however. Europe for a number of years viewed Greece as an economic burden and a source of problems. The recent row over the name of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) exasperated many Europeans. From their side the Greeks felt unsupported from their allies. Economic

adjustments have also to be made by Greece if it is to be included in the second tier countries of monetary integration. If relations with Turkey develop for the worst, that would make this objective unrealistic, with serious economic and political/strategic consequences for Greece.

Muslim Turkey feels alienated from a Christian Europe. Ozal was known to comment bitterly on that. “[Turkey] has been excluded from the process of future planning (European IGC) while others, which had until recently been considered adversaries in the context of European security considerations, have been included.”

(Kedourie, 1996) In a 1995 RAND conference several participants

...questioned whether it was prudent to keep Turkey out of EU. However few countries in Europe support Turkey’s entry into the EU. The official explanation is economic. But...cultural and religious factors also play a role.

After the Gulf war the US rather than Europe was Turkey’s priority. Former Prime Minister and current Foreign Minister Ciller is quoted as saying: “Europe needs Turkey more than Turkey needs Europe.” (Reuters, 20 November 1996) Economics and domestic policies more than strategic concerns have influenced EU-Turkish relations. As transatlantic relations develop one should expect direct repercussions to EU-Turkish relations after American pressures to integrate the strategic component. Adjustments Turkey has to make for a viable EU future include human rights, economic restructuring and foreign policy areas. Important moral victories for human rights advocates have been the judgement of the European Court in the case of Loizidou vs. Turkey and the European Parliament resolution of September 1996 regarding the future of EU-Turkish

relations. As the New York Times wrote on 25 September 1996: “The European Parliament, which has little power but is considered a barometer of political opinion in Western Europe, overwhelmingly passed a resolution....asserting that the human rights had clearly deteriorated since the beginning of 1996. Supporters of the resolution said Turkey was repressing dissent and mistreating political prisoners.” The EU is in a unique position to exercise political pressure on Turkey with the coming talks about Cypriot accession to the EU.

H. CONFLICT RESOLUTION

The issues dividing Greeks and Turks seem interrelated and there is a strong potential for issue linkages during crises. However, each has developed over time its own dynamic and history. The “Aegean dispute” has matured into a complex set of problems, articulated by strong political and legal arguments from both sides⁷⁸. In its course since 1973, it has developed a rich diplomatic history, involving bilateral Protocols and Memoranda, decisions by the International Court, and the UN through the Security Council. Cyprus since 1955 has provided the most violent exchanges. A constitutional structure that provides guarantees for the Turkish minority, yet which is practical enough has been the focus of mediation efforts. Turkish occupation of almost half of the island in direct defiance of continuous UN Resolutions has *de facto*

⁷⁸ It involves issues of territorial sea and national airspace, and the delineation of the continental shelf. A good review is Wilson. For a comparative analysis of positions see Schmitt, 1996

partitioned the island and created different political realities which are difficult to ignore during the exercise of pragmatic foreign policy, especially when the will to confront Turkey is lacking. NATO has been the arena of Greek-Turkish infighting for the shape of command structures and budgetary arrangements. The Southern region command structure has been linked in Greece to issues of national sovereignty, therefore making adjustments difficult and politically costly. Turkey has used it for either denying Greece a form of control over the Aegean or for promoting its own position within the Alliance. The changes in Southern command structure after France's reintegration in the military structure could prove such disputes obsolete. The last issue in the Greek-Turkish agenda has been minority rights for the populations exempted from the exchange conducted after Laussane. Theodoropoulos, himself a participant in Greek-Turkish talks, recounts a history of conflict resolution methods applied to the Greek-Turkish conflict. Despite the seemingly futile attempts at dialogue, which he calls "the dialogue of the deaf," he supports the continuation of the dialogue, with some caution (Theodoropoulos, 1988).

Conflict resolution strategies for Greek-Turkish antagonism build on an ideal end-state regarding the aforementioned issues. Part of the problem in drafting, communicating promoting, and finally implementing resolution strategies, has been the fact that different participants envision different end-states. Greece is considering an Aegean of 12 nautical miles territorial waters its sovereign right. A clearly defined continental shelf using the principles of equidistant lines from islands as well as the mainland is the Greek position in what it presents as a "legal" difference with Turkey. Furthermore, Greece supports the independence of the Cypriot State, with one

government and withdrawal of any foreign troops present on the island⁷⁹. Turkey considers anything more than 6 nautical miles a *causus belli*, would like to divide the Aegean under the principle of equity, and does not accept a change in Cyprus contrary to its security interests (that is almost any change at all.)

The US does not really insist on any unique solution (at least publicly) and is satisfied if the process of reaching an agreement and/or the agreement itself do not disturb American strategic priorities in the area. "It is inescapable that the successful unraveling of the Aegean enigma will prove less dependent on the forum chosen for resolution or the negotiating tactics of the respective sides than on the willingness of the parties to work in good faith." (Schmitt, 1996) However, successful American involvement in the process of conflict resolution would mark a maturity passage of American foreign policy towards Greek-Turkish conflict from one of "bucket brigade" to real preventive diplomacy (Stearns, 1992). American interests in the area include freedom of navigation, the health of NATO, international trade and the ability to support out-of-area operations. A reflection of American pragmatism is the desire to move "beyond legal confines." (Schmitt, 1996)

The EU is anxious to include Cyprus as a healthy economy and a potential outpost of European interests to the Middle East, but would rather live without it if it meant importing to Brussels the well-known problems of Greek-Turkish cohabitation within NATO. The attachment of Turkey as an open market is more important to the

⁷⁹ Resolution 939 (1994) of the UNSC "...reaffirms its position that a Cypriot settlement must be based on a state of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded and comprising politically equal communities...in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation which must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country."

Europeans than any political or security services Turkey can offer now. The UN on its part, has to cope with a long history of ineffectiveness and a continuous undermining of the Secretary General's efforts. To its credit, one could mention the preservation of peace in Cyprus for most of the time since the first deployment of UNFICYP in 1964, given its limited mandate. It would be wrong to assume however that stability in Cyprus has any chance if the Turkish-Cypriot side continues to default on a permanent solution for fear of losing the 1974 spoils in the face of an economically strong and determined Cypriot State. In the meantime, Greek-Turkish crises continue to appear as the underlying differences between the countries are not resolved. NATO, built on the principle of unanimity, could not possibly resolve the issues of Greek-Turkish dispute, though it could provide a forum for communication and consultation as well as crisis control and confidence building as Stearns suggests. The institutional framework of any Greek-Turkish understanding could not ignore the future realities of NATO, WEU and the European security identity.

On that background resolution strategies appear differentiated on where one should start untying the Gordian knot. The Clinton administration seems to have adopted a Cyprus-first approach according to some reports. Cyprus extends the conflict beyond the Aegean waters, and poses greater risks for regional stability. After building some level of trust in Cyprus, problems in the Aegean and NATO could be tackled. Cyprus is of high symbolic significance and could act as a watershed.

Others on the contrary, such as Stearns, support the Aegean-first solution, leaving Cyprus last, or in a parallel track after some confidence has been built. Stearns puts

forward the question of “ripeness.” Statements have been made lately for 1997 as potentially the year of Cyprus resolution (The London Times, 25 October, 1996). There are also those who support a package deal. It is for them considered more possible to find ground for compromise in a multi-issue basket than in a single one. Cofoudakis goes in the opposite direction and addresses Cyprus outside the narrow realm of Greek-Turkish relations in accord with earlier “internationalization” approaches.

Undersecretary of State Kornblum stressed the importance of flexibility in achieving compromise. His proposal --important as coming from the lips of an acting official in a US administration-- is focused on a continuation of Turkish talks with the EU, and the deference of Aegean problems to an arbitrating body, while a re-united Cyprus remains a stated goal. A re-united Cyprus could well be another name for a federated state with a constitutional structure supporting a three-level polity, which would be difficult to implement as some journalistic reports suggest. As the Cypriot Ambassador to the United States, Jacovides, writes:

We certainly welcome such engagement. What is lacking however, is the political will and the flexibility necessary to make a breakthrough toward a compromise solution on the part of Ankara, which has long held the key to such a solution through its military, economic and political dominance of the occupied northern part of Cyprus since 1974. (Washington Post, 9 September 1996)

All of these efforts aim to “overcome suspicions of the past and consolidate the identity of Western culture.” The issue of culture appears here both as a motive and a reprimand. It is not clear, though, if the policy makers in Washington have a clear understanding of what western culture means --outside the walls of their city-- being

born or raised in a culturally dominant society and not having to struggle for the survival of their own culture. A-historical explanations such as Fukuyama's, and their corollary policies, do not sit well in a region where identities have been forming for centuries.

Specific measures to manage the Greek-Turkish conflict include CSBM and defense restructuring arrangements in the fashion of past US-Soviet experiences (Constas, 1991). It is difficult to implement them because they lack political support, and are not seen as promoting stability. A provocative statement or a violation of airspace is enough to cancel any work done in that respect. However, the continuation of a form of dialogue appears vital for any future success. At a more general level Stearns proposes a NATO sanctioned pact of non-aggression negotiated by the two parties themselves (Stearns, 1992). In the words of a US official: "locally determined, internationally sanctioned."⁸⁰

⁸⁰ Interview of the author at the Pentagon with Captain M. Miller, USN. 25 July, 1996

IV. ANALYSIS

A. CRISIS ORIGINS

1. Background

Analysis of complex phenomena such as crises is facilitated by breaking them down into variables that reflect more accurately the research object (Lebow, 1981). Our research focuses on the causes of the crises and on the relative success of mediation efforts to contain them. Every crisis reviewed in Chapter II is broken down into the issues that ignited the conflict and include an examination of the influence different variables had on its outcome. Domestic political considerations, sources of misperception, the international system and the specific politico-military realities relating to each crisis have been examined. Lebow's crisis typology is used to connect those variables together for every crisis study⁸¹. In attempting to identify the origins of the reviewed Greek-Turkish crises one should be aware of a continuity of contentious issues. Analysis of crises from 1955 until today could give us insight for the future of Greek-Turkish conflict.

Our brief bibliographic review in Chapter III suggests two analytically extreme causes for recurrent Greek-Turkish crises. The first explanation posits as the main cause misperceptions held by decision makers reinforced by public images in both countries. The second identifies a power asymmetry between the two countries and a complex set

⁸¹ See footnote 6

of mostly competing Greek-Turkish interests in the region. Our task becomes one of relating the variables presented by the case studies to the explanations stated above. Our initial hypothesis has been that Turkey's attempt to revise the status quo is the primary cause of the crises.

The most important conclusion from our analysis is that all the crises, except one, are what Lebow calls "brinkmanship crises."⁸² Brinkmanship crises develop when "a state knowingly challenges an important commitment of another state in the hope of compelling its adversary to back away from his commitment." (Lebow, 1981) Therefore, brinkmanship crises are manageable, since they express rationally derived strategies and they involve utilitarian calculations by the actors. Despite the large number of crises, Greece and Turkey confronted each other in combat only once. This fact validates the rational actor hypothesis, since it appears that for all decision makers involved war has a greater cost than any potential benefits. With the exception of 1974, all crises show an expectation on the part of the initiator to revise what is perceived as an unfavorable condition through threats. The 1974 crisis has been analyzed from two different perspectives. For the Turkish side, the Greek coup against Makarios was the origin of the crisis, and Turkey intervened to restore peace. Not surprisingly, the Greek side counterargues that Turkey exceeded its powers as a guarantor nation and should not have undertaken the second offensive, especially after the Geneva talks. With the benefit of hindsight and in view of subsequent Greek and Turkish policies on Cyprus, one can

⁸² A disclaimer is proper here. As Lebow remarks for his own analysis, "The assignation of a crisis to a particular category depends upon an analysis of the initiator's objectives in the crisis, its leaders willingness to go to war, and the degree of control they exercise over events. Interpretation of these criteria are likely to vary from scholar to scholar regardless of the extent of available documentation." (Lebow, 1987: 24)

safely classify the 1974 crisis as a “justification of hostility” type, where Turkish leaders took the decision to escalate the crisis during negotiations, when a cease fire was operational. Lebow’s five-step sequence of events usually followed during an initiation of hostilities crisis is a perfect fit for events in 1974 and could have been abstracted from the events following the Greek coup. (Lebow, 1981)

2. Causes for the Crises

In Chapter II, our definition of crisis included the perception of a high probability of escalation to war. Crises are conceptually problematic when one tries to identify a specific “crisis initiation” point in time, due to the close interrelation of events leading up to the crisis. Since tensions are so frequent in Greek-Turkish affairs, that becomes even more difficult. In our attempt to establish an objective criterion, we use the first instance of use of force or the first explicit threat of such use as starting points of reviewed crises. Under that criterion, Turkey has been the challenger in all crises with the exception of the 1967 crisis. Turkish crisis initiations have always been related to events perceived as threatening to vital Turkish security interests. This is an important element of our analysis. Crises become the immediate result of perceptions for threatened security interests. The definition of Turkish security interests, however, is built on the fluid concept of “legality” and on a selective interpretation and implementation of international law (see Chapter III). As the case crises suggest, Turkish security interests in Cyprus and in the Aegean have expanded considerably over time. In 1955 Turkish interests in Cyprus were expressed as a strong objection to any prospect of *enosis*. After

1974, with the *de facto* partition of Cyprus crises there have not been frequent or intense. The decision of the EU to commence accession talks with Cyprus in early 1998, has initiated a new series of crises. In 1996 Turkey threatened full partition in the case of Cypriot inclusion into the EU. The purchase of a defensive missile system by Cyprus in 1997 led to Turkish threats of a pre-emptive attack.

On the Aegean front, Turkish claims were non-existent until 1973. Since 1973 two serious crises have arisen related to continental shelf issues. Today, a *causus belli* is operational in the Aegean in case Greece exercises its sovereign right to extend its territorial sea to 12 nautical miles. In 1996, a crisis related to the sovereignty of a group of islands in the South Eastern Aegean qualitatively expanded Turkish security interests from a dispute over the delineation of maritime boundaries to sovereignty claims over land.

Nonetheless, it was lack of political insight on behalf of the Greek government in 1955 to consider as viable any change in Cyprus against Turkish interests. The immediate issue in the 1955 crisis was the contrast in social and economic status between the Greek minority in Istanbul and the Turkish population. However, the timing of the Turkish government-sponsored riots with the London Tripartite Conference of 1955 suggests that the underlying cause of the crisis was the prospect of *enosis* between Cyprus and Greece. In 1963, fear of a disadvantageous revision of the constitutional structure of the Cypriot state that would deny Turkey effective access to Cypriot politics through the Turkish-Cypriot community prompted Turkey to respond with threats and limited military action against Cyprus. The immediate cause in that case was intra-communal conflict and the

security of the Turkish-Cypriot minority. In 1967 --the only crisis Greece initiated-- immediate causes point to domestic political benefits for the Athens junta. To search for underlying causes for the junta's actions both in 1967 and 1974 is to give credit for strategic planning where it is not due. It would be correct to assume that eventual unification of Cyprus with Greece was a perceived objective in the 1967 crisis, but in 1974 the coup was directed against Makarios personally.

After 1974, there was an extension of immediate causes to include disputes in the Aegean. In all post-1974 crises the status quo of the Aegean has been in some form the underlying cause of the crises. For both countries the Aegean has acquired symbolic importance besides any economic or strategic considerations. Specifically for Greece, the Aegean is seen as an entity with cultural and historic, as well as economic and strategic dimensions. From the Byzantine era, the ruler of the Aegean Sea became the ruler of the Greek mainland. If Turkey follows the *lebensraum* strategic tradition, Greece cannot acquiesce in a loss of its own vital space. It follows that issues such as national pride and status should also be considered alongside legal or strategic considerations in any conflict management attempt. In real terms, Turkey expresses a "fear of entrapment" to justify its claims. It is not a credible argument, since Turkey already enjoys wide access to the Mediterranean and will continue to do so even with a 12-mile Greek territorial sea, due to the transit passage regime (Schmitt, 1996). Furthermore, Turkey has not encountered any Greek-imposed constraints on freedom of navigation, similar to those it imposes on the Dardanelle Straits.

The basis of the Turkish claims in the Aegean is the political concept of equity, as the 1976 and 1987 crises suggest. Greek policy views the Aegean as organically linked with mainland Greece. The Greek islands in the Aegean are not self-sufficient economically, and depend for energy and services such as health care and administration on mainland Greece. They are strategically vulnerable. Any Turkish action which would potentially undercut the unity of Greek space is justifiably considered a threat. Issues ranging from operational command and control arrangements of NATO forces in the Aegean to search and rescue responsibilities acquire a political significance which goes against practicality. The Greek and Turkish positions on the Aegean constitute a zero-sum game which fuels continual crises.

If the underlying causes of the crises are found in conflicting interests, the immediate causes have to be sought in the domestic politics and the perceptions held by both countries. The outcomes of reviewed crises were influenced by them as well. In 1974, hostilities were not the immediate result of Turkish political revisionism since that had been present at least since 1955. Hostilities came as a result of the absence of a credible Greek deterrent and the presence of a legal argument for intervention. In 1976, the Turkish government deliberately initiated a crisis over exploration rights in the Aegean under internal political pressure. The crisis underscored Turkish plans to share the Aegean. The escalating Greek response came after strong debates in Parliament where the opposition called for a sinking of the Turkish vessel. The 1987 crisis arose out of a Turkish misperception of Greek intentions. While the Greek government nationalized the company responsible for oil explorations in the Aegean to avoid an

inadvertent crisis provoked by the company's publicized intention to conduct drillings in the continental shelf outside Greek territorial waters, Turkey viewed it as a clear indication of Greek assertiveness, and thus damaging for Turkish interests. The crisis was not avoided even though technically there was no capability for oil drilling for at least six more months.

The question of underlying and immediate causes cannot be answered effectively if we do not identify the different levels on which the Greek -Turkish conflict resides. As the crises suggest, we observe conflicting national interests between Greece and Turkey. But this realization is inadequate. In the final analysis conflict arises from a different cosmology --how both countries view the world-- and a conflicting ontology --what role every country reserves for itself. Core goals and values as well as national interests are in contrast. Greece has a western orientation, its society focuses on the individual and civic liberties are respected to a degree commonly found among western European nations. Greece furthermore does not aspire to the role of a regional power, despite it being the most politically and economically stable Balkan nation. Turkey, in contrast, although strategically committed to the West since Ataturk, is characterized by a troubled democracy, an authoritarian society, and serious human rights violations. Turkey's regional power aspirations have consistently troubled many of its neighbors, including Greece, a NATO ally. This becomes more apparent as we analyze the politics and perceptions that have shaped every crisis.

3. Politics and Misperception

Politics in both countries have intensified the underlying causes of the conflict, and made conflict resolution difficult. Political considerations in crises include: Turkish policies of national identity, nationalistic inflammatory policies promoted by both sides, and Turkish political instability coupled with a not-so-open society. In 1923, Kemal built the new Turkish state on the basis of an ethnic Turkish identity. To preserve Turkish national integrity other identities were suppressed. The politics of national identity in Turkey exercised a deleterious effect on the 1955 crisis, with the Istanbul pogroms. In 1963, the Greek minority in Istanbul had many of its members deported as retaliatory tactics for events in Cyprus. Even as late as 1987 the issue of property rights for the Greek minority in Turkey was the subject of post-crisis negotiations, and shows the minimal real progress made over the years. Minority related issues represent deep-rooted differences in values. The Muslim minority in Thrace and the remnants of a once vibrant Greek community in Istanbul do not pose an immediate threat to regional stability⁸³. But in a conflict where issues are easily linked they can become political liabilities for an eventual resolution, as the 1963 case study shows.

The 1967 crisis reflects the effect nationalistic domestic policies have had on crises. The Greek junta, trying to muster domestic support, apparently authorized or acquiesced in an ill-fated para-military campaign in Cyprus professing nationalistic ideals. Makarios was not even consulted, and the crisis ended with humiliating terms for the Greek side, including the withdrawal of the Greek regiment in Cyprus, which had

⁸³ It is protected as a "Muslim minority" after the Treaty of Laussane. Muslims in Thrace are either ethnic

been stationed there after the 1963-4 crisis. Greek political instability until 1974 did not help resolve crises in Cyprus and denied Greece the coercive power to pursue a more independent foreign policy. The 1974 *de facto* partition of Cyprus changed the security setting so that domestic political realities in Athens became irrelevant to issues in Cyprus. An advanced degree of democratic consolidation also minimized drastic changes on Greek foreign policy as governments succeeded one another. As the 1976 and 1987 crises suggest, political differences among Greek parties became differences of means and not of ends.

Since 1970, the domestic scene in Turkey has played a more dominant role in the conflict. The ascendance of new classes with differentiated interests has created tensions between the Turkish Armed Forces and the political establishment. In 1976, a weak Turkish government adopted a nationalistic position on the continental shelf issue and withdrew the previously accepted appeal to the International Court. In 1987 Ozal was faced with internal domestic and bureaucratic pressures to discontinue the Davos process. Similar pressures were exerted in Greece on Papandreou. The recent ascendance to power of the Islamic Welfare Party creates one more source of domestic political tension with possible repercussions in Greek-Turkish relations and regional stability, since nationalistic policies are widely perceived as a safe method to gain popular support. The lack of an open society in Turkey presents another challenge for stability in the area. Public support is considered given for matters of foreign policy and state authority is not questioned. In 1987 Turkish actions were not debated domestically,

Turks or Pomaks. Turkey refers consistently to the minority as a "Turkish minority."

while the Greek government had to explain escalation to a heated Parliament and a politically sensitive public.

However domestic political realities have not changed either Greek or Turkish foreign policy goals. Even as governments have succeeded one another, crises show the prevalence of security-military over political-economic approaches to the conflict. The continuity in expressed Turkish security interests in the Aegean and Cyprus and the Greek security doctrine which recognizes a threat to the East make supporting the misperception thesis difficult to sustain at the conflict cause level. Misperceptions have arisen in the past but cannot be classified as the sources of Greek-Turkish conflict. In 1955 the Greek government did not realize the degree of Turkish interest in Cyprus, but it is doubtful if such a realization would have stopped the initiation of the struggle for *enosis*, given the strong popular support. In 1963 Turkey had a misperception about the American commitment to its defense but was correct in judging Makarios's thirteen points as in effect minimizing Turkish influence on Cypriot affairs. In 1967 the military junta in Athens did not contemplate a Turkish forcible response, yet its dual policy of undermining Makarios and nationalistic hyperbole created another crisis in 1974 despite the lessons of 1967. In 1987 Turkish misperceptions of Greek intentions validated Turkish interests for a revision of the Aegean status quo. Perceptions are not limited to the countries involved but are extended to mediators as well. Discontent with American reactions to the conflict came from all sides at some point and damaged US credibility for impartiality over both sides of the Aegean. In 1974 Greeks expected an allied

intervention to restore order in Cyprus and constrain Turkey, especially after the second part of the Turkish attack.

Misperceptions come at different levels and acquire different amounts of significance at every level for successful conflict resolution. Lebow identifies three possible sources of misperception: bureaucratic misperceptions originating from the decision making process, situational misperceptions arising from the political context, and perspective misperceptions relating to images of oneself, images of the other and images of the other's image of oneself. For Greek-Turkish crises perspective misperceptions have been the most important even as situational or bureaucratic misperceptions have been present as well. For the 1955 case, situational and perspective perceptions were involved in relating events in Cyprus with the Greek minority in Istanbul. Perspective misperceptions about the "evil Greek" permeated a willing public and led to the extensive riots. In 1974, Greek bureaucratic misperceptions of the possible Turkish reaction to the planned coup against Makarios led to the disastrous decision. The decision making process was seriously impaired by the absence of any opposition to Ioannide's authoritative rule. Turkish perceptions of a demonstrated Greek unwillingness to fight in 1963 and 1967 facilitated the decision to launch the Cyprus "peace operations." In 1987 the Turkish bureaucracy did not expect the forceful Greek protest and Ozal was at pains to persuade his military for a withdrawal.

What appears common in all cases is the a priori codification of any action by the other country as at least suspicious. The 1987 crisis clearly shows an inclination of the Turkish side to assign bad intentions to a Greek action which clearly aimed in avoiding

crises. The Greek side has similarly assigned symbolic value to other incidents, making them harder to de-escalate (e.g. the 1996 crisis). In all cases there is the perception of an adversary. It is based in recent as well as past history. This strong perspective is not necessarily a misperception. After so many instances of adversarial relationships it would be myopic to outright reject Greek-Turkish animosity as arising out of outmoded and hawkish misperceptions. Misperceptions are part of the conflict as they have become institutionalized. As Mitchell writes: "Conflict attitudes and perceptions are assumed to be factors arising through the stresses of being in a conflict, rather than factors fundamentally causing conflicts, although extreme conflict attitudes involving hostility, misperceptions and dehumanisation of the opposing party will obviously exacerbate any dispute. Furthermore, it is undoubtedly the case that previous experience of a conflict will leave residual elements of prejudice and hostility to affect future behavior, and these may become contributory sources of future disputes." (Mitchell, 1994) For example, the 1955 crisis showed the effect the "Cretan syndrome" had in Turkish foreign policy⁸⁴. However, if conflictual interests would not have been present such animosities would be easy to overcome through normal political and other exchanges of proper neighborly relations.

⁸⁴ It was named after Crete's transfer to Greece at the beginning of the twentieth century. The Turks have partly explained the demise of the Ottoman empire by demonizing the "evil Greek."

4. Context of Crises

The crises under review suggest that the international and regional realities, as well as domestic politics within the US, have had their own effect on Greek-Turkish crises. They appeared when relations among the superpowers were not extremely tenuous. The 1955 crisis came after Stalin's death, an event related by some analysts to the pogroms, as the case study suggests. In 1963 and 1967, the cold war had given way to what would be later called *détente*. In 1974, the Soviet Union did not interfere beyond verbal condemnation.

Greek-Turkish crises were also easier to contain when both countries faced a common enemy. The 1955 crisis shows a remarkable subjugation of Greek interests to the allied cause. The 1963 and 1967 cases reflect a period when allied or American concerns presided over Greek or Turkish national sensitivities. For example, in 1964 the Johnson letter came two months after the first indication of a permanent Soviet deployment in the Mediterranean. Containment of the crises at those times had been immediate and successful. In contrast, relaxation of tensions between US and Soviet Union/Russia resulted in an increase in Greek-Turkish crises. Alliance cohesion mattered less for Greek and Turkish policy makers than did national security agendas. Foreign policy choices by both countries were possible without immediate external coercion. The effect US domestic politics have had on the Greek-Turkish conflict is exemplified in the 1974 crisis. In 1974, the Watergate scandal, an internal re-organization of State Department regional desks, and the Arab-Israeli crisis demanded more resources from American diplomacy than were available to successfully contain the

Cyprus crisis. Lack of coordination and Kissinger's personal conduct of foreign policy seem to have been the main causes for the American failure. In 1987, the US chose not to intervene drastically as it had done for the crises of 1964 and 1967, and NATO's Secretary General, Lord Carrington, undertook the role of mediator with successful results.

Political-military realities during crises point to the primacy of the local against the general balance of power between Greece and Turkey. In 1963 and in 1987, the local balance of power was reflected in the crisis outcome. but 1967 is a deviation. Even as Greeks enjoyed local superiority, the colonels' decision to refrain from action show the effect misperceptions have had on the outcome of the crisis. In 1974, the readiness of Greek Armed Forces at the time was generally questionable and the local balance of power did not represent any great departure from the general one. Another related continuity in Greek-Turkish crises has been the focused use of military forces. Even if political issues are complex, military means are used during crises to support selected objectives which represent the immediate causes of the crisis. In the cases studied a generalized war did not occur even when units by both countries were involved in intense maneuvering. Horizontal dispersion of the crises has been minimal if not absent. It is one more argument for the rational approach by decision makers in both sides of the Aegean, and a hopeful sign for the management of the conflict.

B. CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND MEDIATION EFFECTIVENESS

To understand and evaluate crisis management efforts adopted by third parties we resort to a comparison of undertaken policies and initiatives with ideal management proposals made by Alexander George. George differentiates between political and operational principles for crisis management (George, 1991). Political principles are: (1) limitation of objectives and (2) limitation of means employed on behalf of those objectives. Operational principles include: (1) political authorities must maintain informed control over military options; (2) the tempo of military maneuvers should allow for effective crisis communication and decision making; (3) movements of military forces have to be carefully coordinated with diplomatic actions; (4) use and threat of use of force should be consistent with the diplomatic objectives; (5) security spirals should be avoided; (6) diplomatic-military options that are consistent with a desire to negotiate should be chosen and (7) the opponent should be left a way out of the conflict.

Political principles for sound crisis management have been followed in Greek-Turkish crises. That fact supports the view that the conflict is controllable. Of the crises reviewed here, only the 1974 case resulted in open hostilities between Greek and Turkish forces. Before 1974, specifically in 1963 and 1967, the Greek lack of political control over military forces in Cyprus resulted in crisis escalation, but in both cases generalized war was avoided. However, the political objectives which constitute the basis for the conflict have expanded through the years. In 1955, the Turkish political objective was the denial of a change in Cyprus's status favorable to Greece and conflicting with

Turkish security interests. In 1963 the Turkish political objective was to consolidate its position in Cyprus and avoid a constitutional change. The 1967 crisis is different since Greeks initiated the crisis. In 1974 Turkey's political objectives were the partition of Cyprus. The 1976 and 1987 crises reflected the Turkish political objective of challenging the Aegean status quo. Some analysts have viewed the 1976 crisis as a Turkish attempt to pre-empt the European Community against accepting Greece as a full member. The association council for reviewing the Greek case was scheduled for mid-July 1976, when the crisis broke out (Constas, 1991, p.209). A similar strategy seems to be employed by Turkey in the case of Cyprus in 1997. In 1996, Greek sovereignty over Aegean islands was effectively challenged, even as a return to the status quo ante was pronounced after the crisis. Political objectives have been constant for Greece since 1955, despite the major change in strategic realities after 1974. The recent Greek-Cypriot "unified defense doctrine" (see Chapter III) is an attempt to reverse those strategic realities. Operational crisis management principles have been generally followed after 1974, again supporting the argument that Greek-Turkish conflict arises out of rational utility calculations. The conflict is expressed mostly through brinkmanship crises, therefore it is potentially manageable. The security spiral however, has not been avoided. There is an ongoing arms race between Greece and Turkey with disastrous effects for both economies. Per capita Greek and Turkish defense expenditures are the highest in NATO.

Characteristics of national strategies followed during crises display important continuities. Turkey has initiated most of the crises and has explicitly "drawn the line"

of its interests every time. Turkey has also shown a greater propensity to use or threaten to use force. Greece has largely followed a deterrent strategy, attempting to balance its lack of power with outside guarantees and interventions. Greece since 1955 has connected NATO participation and commitments with implicit security guarantees against Turkey, even though the Washington Treaty does not offer a basis for such guarantees. Who would have thought in 1948 that allies have to be protected from each other? In 1955, more as a protest, Greece withdrew its forces from NATO Headquarters in Izmir. The same tactic was followed in 1974, when Greece withdrew from the Military Command Structure, a largely symbolic gesture with consequences both for Greece and the Alliance. Since 1974, Greek reliance on external forces has been limited, as the 1987 crisis suggests; however Greece continuously searches for political commitments supporting its position in the conflict. Negotiations after crises have always been proposed by Turkey, only in the form of bilateral negotiations instead of arbitration through an international body such as the International Court, which is the Greek position. Greece, by declining to participate in bilateral negotiations is blamed for intransigence.

The strategies adopted depend on each country's perspective, and could give some support for the misperception thesis. Turkey in the crises of 1963, 1967, 1974 and 1987 viewed Greek actions as *faits accomplis* against Turkish security interests. Turkey's own actions therefore were considered as coercive diplomacy against a threatening neighbor. With the exception of 1967, Greek actions have been at the political level and did not involve the use of force or the threat of such use. If there was

a perceived provocation there have always been open diplomatic channels between the two countries (even in 1974) to resolve such differences. Turkey by directly escalating legal issues to crises has consistently attempted to de-legalize the issues and promote a political settlement which is favorable to Turkey as it reflects power status considerations.

Greece views Turkey's actions either as *faits accomplis* (1974), blackmail (*causus belli*, Cypriot accession to EU) or as controlled pressure (1955, 1963, 1987). Its own actions are perceived as parts of a general deterrent strategy, drawing lines and conveying commitment. Use of coercive diplomacy has been minimal despite lip service paid to it. In 1955, verbal protests were made to demand a rather symbolic compensation for the extent of material damages made. In 1963 Greek planes did not engage Turkish fighters over Cyprus. In 1967 Greek forces did not participate in action despite their local superiority. This fact has not been unnoticed by the Turkish side and in 1974 Turkish planners evaluated negatively Greek willingness to fight. In 1974, as if to support such estimations, Greek submarines were recalled from patrols near Cyprus probably to avoid any generalization of the conflict. In 1976 the Greek side did agree by the Bern Protocol to "avoid any provocation." In 1987, Greece accepted bilateral talks despite earlier positions against conducting bilateral talks with Turkey before Turkey withdrew its occupation forces from Cyprus. The 1996 crisis poses questions about the extent to which the Greek side is ready to commit its forces during a confrontation. Since Greece has adopted a deterrence strategy --immediate for the Aegean and extended for Cyprus-- it is important for its success to show a willingness to use force when the line has been

crossed. Attempting to increase its deterrent capability Greece has always vied for political support of its position from third parties and organizations. Some analysts contend that Greek policy is not limited to deterrence, since it seeks a reversal of the situation in Cyprus. However, even the more limited, deterrent part of the strategy appears problematic since there is a dichotomy between Greek rhetoric and Greek practice in defending the status quo. This is rationally explained through a comparison of utilities between the status quo and any prospect of military action. Nonetheless, it creates conditions for an unmanageable situation, since the deterrent is not operational.

Rogers has classified crisis bargaining codes in four basic categories (George, 1991). He examines “three pivotal crisis bargaining issues: (1) an image of the adversary, including beliefs about the adversary’s typical objectives, decision making style, and typical bargaining strategy; (2) an image of crisis dynamics, including beliefs about the nature of crisis escalation and the manner in which a war might erupt in a crisis; and (3) general beliefs about the optimal mixture and timing of coercion, accommodation, and persuasion in an overall bargaining strategy.” (George, 1991, p.415) Even as crisis bargaining codes are highly context-dependent since they depend on specific personalities and decision processes, we identify in Greek-Turkish crises more type B-II bargaining codes than others from both sides. Greek and Turkish decision makers appear aware of the political dimensions of the crisis, they have a high degree of confidence that inadvertent escalation can be prevented, and they occasionally include a carrot in their crisis bargaining strategy. However, they still favor coercion as early as possible, to the extent of committing *faits accomplis*. Crisis management with B-II

bargaining types from both sides of the dividing line becomes more predictable since both sides assign primary importance to a rational estimation of the situation. Despite the predictability, such encounters are explosive due to the over-reliance on military means, especially to their pre-emptive use.

Mediation efforts have been successful in avoiding imminent crises, although without resolving the underlying causes for the conflict. The United States has consistently been the provider of mediation services between the two countries. Its mediation strategy could be characterized as power mediation with implicit or explicit threats accompanying the proposed solutions, especially before 1974. The European Union is seen as a partial and biased entity by Turkey since Greece is one of its members. However, the EU is in a unique political position to provide mediation services, especially if Turkey continues to pursue its policy of Europeanization⁸⁵. The United Nations has provided peacekeeping personnel in Cyprus continuously since 1964. NATO has not been able to resolve any differences between the two countries, even those originating within the alliance, perhaps due to its unanimity constraint in decision making. Several characteristics for past mediation efforts become apparent after analysis of the crises reviewed.

Mediation efforts have had as their goal regional stability without due regard to specific Greek or Turkish national interests. This had been more pronounced in crises before 1974. Short-term stability was secured in all crises, with 1974 being the important

⁸⁵ After the 1987 crisis, in 1988 the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling upon EPC (European Political Cooperation) to put pressure on the Turkish government, which is linked to the European Community by an association agreement and is an applicant for full membership, to draw up a precise timetable for the withdrawal of its troops and that of the Turkish settlers from Cyprus

exception. However, stability came with the US maintaining an equidistant policy from both Greece and Turkey. Given the revisionist nature of the conflict, stability is not synonymous with equilibrium⁸⁶. There is a qualitative difference between the two which represents conflict dynamics. Crises have shown the expansion of Turkish political objectives. If at all crises the mediator adopts equal distances from conflicting parties, over time the median position will be closer to the initial position of the actor continually expanding his agenda, even as crisis management would have been successful for separate crises.

Power mediation in 1963 and 1967 helped both parties realize the potential for losses from a continued crisis, and has forcefully underlined the need for stability in the region. Despite the nature of mediation, the 1974, 1976, and 1987 crises showed the limited effect the US has had on the course of events during crises. Mediation has to take another form to induce both parties to identify potential gains from a revision of their contemporary zero-sum strategies. Keashly and Fisher propose a contingency model for successful third-party intervention, which takes into account the stage of the conflict and a continuous intervention by utilizing a succession of intervention techniques appropriate for the situation. A brief table of available intervention options is shown as Table 3:

⁸⁶ It is reminded that disequilibrium is considered as “change beyond the threshold of reversibility.” Stability is defined as “change within explicit bounds.” Both definitions in Brecher, 1986

	<i>Intervention sequence</i>	
<i>Stage of conflict</i>		
Discussion	Coalition (assist communication)	Negotiation (settle interests)
Polarization	Consultation (improve relations)	Pure mediation (settle interests)
Segregation	Arbitration, Power mediation (control hostility)	Consultation (improve relations)
Destruction	Peacekeeping (control violence)	Arbitration, Consultation, Development aid

Table 3. Contingency model of intervention. Adapted from Bercovitch, 1996, p.245

In the Greek-Turkish case, there seems to be a need for arbitration before any power mediation effort addresses the control of hostilities, since the conflict has already reached the segregation phase. The crises discussed here suggest a dynamic in the conflict which is beyond the immediate short-term effects of power mediation even if they appear successful.

Boundary setting has for a long time been considered a safe method of establishing security guarantees and is the concept upon which the current international system of nation states operates. To address the underlying causes of Greek-Turkish conflict a set of principled, internationally-sanctioned “guaranteed boundaries” seems necessary to allow both countries to re-examine their threat calculations.

V. CONCLUSIONS

The reviewed crises suggest the presence of different immediate and underlying causes. The underlying cause of the Greek-Turkish conflict is a set of incompatible interests in the Aegean and Cyprus. Those interests are defined in relation to one another in what becomes a zero-sum competition for primacy in a volatile and complex geopolitical region. Turkey, following its ascending regional status since 1955, has made steady effort to revise the situation established in the region by the treaties of Laussane, Montreux, and Paris. Crises reveal political goals --clearly stated by Turkey-- which are supportive of such a revision. The appearance of Aegean disputes after 1973 and the gradual transformation of Turkish political objectives in Cyprus, as exemplified in the crises before and after 1974, testify to the continuity of Turkish revisionism.

Beyond the existence of underlying causes of conflict in Greek-Turkish relations, there exists a set of phenomena and processes such as crises initiations, crises management and crises outcome which is directly related to the immediate causes of the conflict. Immediate causes include changes in the international or regional system, domestic politics, institutionalized perceptions of animosity, and the local balance of power, as well as crisis-dependent politico-military considerations. The inclusion of immediate causes becomes necessary if one attempts to explain the difference in outcomes of crises, given the continuities in political objectives.

Therefore, competition between Greece and Turkey exists in multiple dimensions, qualifying the “real” interest-based conflict. Cultural differences and the

separate historical developments of the respective polities have resulted in state and societal structures which hold different values. On the other hand, both countries shared common allies and enemies for a long time, a condition resulting in security arrangements which brought them closer together. In reality, the history of Greek-Turkish crises seems to be the history of competitive centrifugal national interests and centripetal alliance or multilateral commitments. Mediation attempts have played an important role in Greek-Turkish crises by attempting to reinforce those centripetal commitments, at least since 1955.

However, mediation has focused more on the immediate causes of the crises, because the intended outcome of mediation attempts has been regional stability instead of Greek-Turkish conflict management. Power mediation has been successful nonetheless, given that rationality eventually prevailed on both sides of the Aegean. All crises except the one that resulted in combat in 1974 can be categorized as brinkmanship crises. The defusion of each crisis though, did not ameliorate animosities. The underlying causes of the conflict have been largely ignored, reflecting the ad hoc and reactive nature of all mediations. Since 1974, and especially since 1987, the growing involvement of the European Community (now European Union) in the conflict allows for some optimism. Political-economic considerations may well achieve primacy over strict strategic-military ones if a contingency model for conflict management is followed. Such a model provides for power mediation to avoid or contain hostilities but most important is complemented by a series of measures to resolve the deeper, underlying causes of conflictual behavior.

As a final note, we should stress the potential for failure and its implications in managing Greek-Turkish conflict. Past crises show us the basically rational character of both Greek and Turkish decision makers. The potential for conflict escalation however, should be related to utility calculations involving the status quo as well as to the potential gains and losses for each country in different scenarios. Experience since 1955 shows that both countries, when their national interest dictated, did not hesitate to confront NATO or US policies. The future of NATO, US Balkan and Middle Eastern policies, and European security and foreign policy interests are more assured with a Greek-Turkish rapprochement. The question of “how” can only be answered by a holistic view of the conflict, and not by biased compromises, specially among allies.

[The text in this section is extremely faint and illegible. It appears to be a list or a series of paragraphs, but the content cannot be discerned.]

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
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